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NAVIGATING 21ST CENTURY TAX JURISDICTION
Hayes R. Holderness*
Hailed as a massive victory for the states, the Supreme Court’s 2018
decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. brought dated state tax
jurisdiction standards into the twenty-first century, freeing the states
to tax internet vendors. However, the decision left the larger state tax
jurisdiction doctrine undertheorized and at a crossroads: should the
doctrine concern itself only with notice and fairness issues akin to
those found in the due process personal jurisdiction realm, or should
it also concern itself with protecting interstate commerce from undue
state tax burdens?
This Article argues for the latter path by developing a robust theory of
state tax jurisdiction that focuses on the potential undue burdens of tax
compliance costs, burdens that a threshold jurisdictional standard is
uniquely able to address. From this compliance burden theory
emerges a jurisdictional standard which would protect interstate
commerce—particularly the activities of small businesses and entities
that facilitate the commerce of others, such as online marketplaces,
payment intermediaries, and common carriers—from the chilling
effects of heavy state tax compliance costs. The Article concludes by
demonstrating how unanswered questions from Wayfair provide
opportunities to incorporate the proposed standard into the state tax
jurisdiction doctrine, detailing the way forward from Wayfair.
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INTRODUCTION
“So how many sales does it take?” Justice Sotomayor asked during
oral arguments for South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 1 the landmark 2018
decision in which the Supreme Court reconsidered decades of doctrine
regarding state tax power.2 Justice Sotomayor was trying to discern
when an out-of-state vendor would have a constitutionally-sufficient
connection with a state such that the state could tax the vendor. The
South Dakota Attorney General’s answer? “[O]ne sale.”3 Internet
vendors and small businesses shuddered;4 South Dakota’s position
could have exposed them to a wealth of new state tax obligations.
For its part, the Wayfair majority skirted Justice Sotomayor’s
question and instead concluded that the constitutionally-sufficient
connection—termed “nexus”5—exists when the taxpayer6
“purposefully avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on
business in that jurisdiction.”7 Students of due process personal
jurisdiction doctrine perked up, but their excitement should be
tempered. The Wayfair Court was articulating a nexus standard
imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause, not the Due Process
Clause,8 and the state tax jurisprudence has recognized that the two
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. My
sincerest gratitude to those who have offered their time, energy, and insight to help
improve this Article: Andrew Appleby, Jud Campbell, Erin Collins, Paul Crane,
Jessica Erickson, Jim Gibson, Kevin Walsh, Corinna Lain, Luke Norris, Rick Pomp,
Jack Preis, Danny Schaffa, Darien Shanske, Allison Tait, and Adam Thimmesch.
Thanks also to the participants in the 2018 Junior Tax Scholars Conference at the
University of Colorado Law School and to the faculty of the Temple University
Beasley School of Law for their rigorous workshopping of this Article. Finally, for
her excellent research, I owe a great deal of appreciation to Sherfón Coles-Williams.
1
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct.
2080 (2018) (No. 17-494).
2
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
3
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct.
2080 (2018) (No. 17-494).
4
Justice Breyer has expressed concerns about state jurisdiction over small
sellers a number of times, invoking the examples of a small mandolin seller and an
Appalachian potter. See id.; J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780,
2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
5
See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, A Primer on State Tax Nexus: Law, Power, &
Policy, 55 ST. TAX NOTES 555, 555 (2010).
6
For ease of discussion, this Article will refer to a person on whom a state is
attempting to place an obligation either to collect or to pay a tax as a “taxpayer.” The
Supreme Court has applied the same jurisdictional rules to both tax collectors and
taxpayers in the case law. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“As an original matter, it might have been possible to
distinguish between jurisdiction to tax and jurisdiction to compel collection of taxes
as agent for the State, but we have rejected that.”).
7
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
8
For ease of discussion, the Article refer to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as the Due Process Clause. Likewise, references to due
process concerns address concerns arising under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not that of the Fifth Amendment.
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clauses address different concerns.9 The Due Process Clause is
concerned with fundamental notions of fairness and with providing
taxpayers notice of state tax power over them; the dormant Commerce
Clause is concerned with protecting against the “economic
Balkanization” of the states.10
The Wayfair majority’s due-process-esque dormant Commerce
Clause nexus standard is symptomatic of one of the state tax
jurisprudence’s core problems: the nexus concept is complicated and
confusing. This confusion manifests throughout the development of
the case law, which has led to a complicated array of nexus
requirements. There is a due process nexus requirement which appears
to track the due process personal jurisdiction requirement,11 and there
is a dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement that bifurcates into
requiring both a state connection with the taxpayer and a state
connection with the activity taxed.12 Adding further to the complexity,
the standards for both aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus
requirement have been undertheorized and underdeveloped in the case
law, leading to decisions turning on conclusory statements about when
the standards are satisfied. This Article tackles these problems in order
to provide coherence to the dormant Commerce clause nexus
doctrine.13
Not to sell the decision short, Wayfair did provide some measure
of coherence to the doctrine by scraping a questionable but long
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 (“[T]he Clauses pose distinct limits on the taxing
powers of the States. Accordingly, while a State may, consistent with the Due
Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax
may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.”).
10
See id. at 312; Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089.
11
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-08 (discussing the due process nexus requirement).
12
This Article refers to the two aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus
requirement respectively as “personal nexus”—nexus with the taxpayer—and
“transactional nexus”—nexus with the activity taxed. Others have used different
terms to refer to the same concepts. See Arthur R. Rosen & Marc D. Bernstein, State
Taxation of Corporations: The Evolving Danger of Attributional Nexus, 41 TAX
EXECUTIVE 533, 534 (1989) (referring to the concepts as “presence nexus” and
“transactional nexus”); accord Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and
Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38
GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (referring to the concepts as “enforcement jurisdiction” and
“substantive jurisdiction”).
13
Those versed in state taxation may be surprised to find no mention of the term
“substantial nexus” in this Introduction. The reason for this omission is that this
Article argues that, while the dormant Commerce Clause imposes a threshold
jurisdictional restriction on states, that restriction comes from the dormant
Commerce Clause’s prohibition of undue burdens on interstate commerce. Others
have forcefully argued that the “substantial nexus” term is meaningless and should
be abandoned. This Article argues that the term, whether meaningless before or not,
provides a clear place to locate dormant Commerce Clause’s threshold jurisdiction
inquiry. However, because that inquiry derives from the dormant Commerce
Clause’s restriction on undue burdens, it is admittedly not necessary to cabin it in the
existing terminology that pervades state tax jurisprudence.
9
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standing dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard requiring a
taxpayer’s physical presence in the taxing state. This physical presence
rule had prevented the states from requiring internet vendors like
Amazon.com to collect their sales taxes, which was a major source of
frustration for the states.14 Despite bringing the dormant Commerce
Clause nexus standard into the twenty-first century, Wayfair did little
to address larger confusions over the dormant Commerce Clause nexus
requirement. In particular, the opinion passed up opportunities to give
meaning to its nexus standard and to better explain the relationship
between the due process nexus requirement and the dormant
Commerce Clause nexus requirement.15 In short, Wayfair left the
dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine in an unhelpful limbo by
failing to provide a clear path forward for the doctrine.
This failure has predictably spurred commentary attempting to sort
out the decision’s meaning, but the commentary has not fully
addressed the significant crossroads for the dormant Commerce Clause
nexus doctrine that Wayfair created.16 Two paths diverge from the
Wayfair crossroads, either of which the decision can be read to
support: the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard might collapse
into the due process personal jurisdiction standard, or it might be
strengthened into a standard that addresses in earnest the threat of
economic Balkanization that the dormant Commerce Clause targets.
Should the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard be allowed to
collapse into the due process personal jurisdiction standard, many
taxpayers would face uncertain and potentially burdensome state tax
14

See infra note 219.
The lack of clarity regarding the relationship between the Due Process Clause
and the dormant Commerce Clause in jurisdictional settings is not limited to the area
of state taxation. See generally John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause as a
Limit on Personal Jurisdiction, 102 IOWA L. REV. 121 (2016) (analyzing the
relationship between the dormant Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause in
the context of personal adjudicative jurisdiction).
16
E.g. Richard D. Pomp, Wayfair and the Myth of Substantial Nexus, 36 J. ST.
TAXATION 27 (2018); Michael T. Fatale, Wayfair, What’s Fair, and Undue Burden,
90 ST. TAX NOTES 857 (2018);Walter Hellerstein & Andrew Appleby, Substantive
and Enforcement Jurisdiction in a Post-Wayfair World, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 283
(2018); Billy Hamilton, Wayfair Emotional Support, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 1067 (2018);
Jeffery S. Reed, What Is the New Constitutional Test After Wayfair?, 89 ST. TAX
NOTES 335 (2018); Jaye Calhoun & William J. Kolarik II, Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Historic Decision in Wayfair, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 125 (2018). Adam
Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage have examined major implications
of the decision in an informative series of articles. See Adam Thimmesch, Darien
Shanske, & David Gamage, Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden, 89 ST.
TAX NOTES 447 (2018) [hereinafter, Substantial Nexus]; Adam Thimmesch, Darien
Shanske, & David Gamage, Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax Nexus,
89 ST. TAX NOTES 975 (2018) [hereinafter, Sales Tax Formalism]; Darien Shanske,
David Gamage, & Adam Thimmesch, Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors,
90 ST. TAX NOTES 111 (2018) [hereinafter, Marketplaces]. Others have considered
implications of the decision outside of the tax law. See Allan Erbsen, Wayfair
Undermines Nicastro: The Constitutional Connection Between State Tax Authority
and Personal Jurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J.F. __ (forthcoming 2019).
15
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obligations, which may chill their willingness to engage in interstate
commerce.17 Taxpayers of particular concern are small business and
entities that facilitate the commerce of others, such as online
marketplaces similar to Amazon Marketplace and eBay, payment
intermediaries like MasterCard and Visa, and common carriers such as
FedEx and UPS.
To prevent these harms and realize the dormant Commerce
Clause’s goal of protecting the national economy from unduly
burdensome state actions, the Wayfair crossroads must be navigated
carefully. Doing so demands a robust theory of the dormant Commerce
Clause nexus requirement to guide the doctrine forward. This Article
seizes on the opportunity presented by Wayfair and develops such a
theory—the “compliance burden theory”—as well as the standard that
follows from that theory. While others have theorized the dormant
Commerce Clause nexus requirement in the past,18 this Article is the
first to incorporate the lessons from Wayfair into the theory and to
develop a post-Wayfair standard from that theory.
The compliance burden theory is realized by returning to the
fundamental principle driving the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine: the protection of interstate commerce from undue burdens of
state actions. The Article asks what role, if any, a threshold nexus
requirement has to play in fulfilling this principle in the context of state
taxation. A state tax might burden interstate commerce through a high
tax rate, a distorted tax base, or heavy tax compliance costs.
Established guardrails protect interstate commerce from unduly
burdensome tax rates and tax bases, but heavy tax compliance costs
present a different breed of problem for interstate commerce. Tax
compliance costs include such things as the labor and systems required
to ensure that taxes are correctly paid, the ability to access funds to pay
the tax, and the costs and risks associated with handling audits by state
17

Preis makes a similar argument in the context of personal adjudicative
jurisdiction based on the registration of a business in a state; though the Due Process
Clause may be satisfied, such exercises of jurisdiction over interstate businesses
could prevent those businesses from registering in the state or from entering the state
at all. See Preis, supra note 15, at 144-54.
18
See, e.g., Hayes R. Holderness, Questioning Quill, 37 VA. TAX REV. 313, 33139 (2018) (offering a rationale for the physical presence rule based on the taxpayer’s
ability to access funds from the activity taxed); Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller
Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1144-45 (2016) (offering
a political rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement in that it
allowed the Supreme Court to pass the issue to Congress); Gamage & Heckman,
supra note 21, at 498-503 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause nexus
requirement is concerned about the excess burden placed on interstate taxpayers
subject to multiple tax compliance regimes); Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax
Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA.
TAX REV. 1, 4 (2008) (offering a political-voice-based justification for the dormant
Commerce Clause nexus and apportionment regimes).
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revenue departments.19 These costs are relatively flat; they hit
interstate commerce immediately once a state tax is imposed and
change little as the amount of the activity taxed increases.20
A threshold nexus inquiry is uniquely situated to protect interstate
commerce from the burden of tax compliance costs by preventing the
taxing state from imposing a tax (and thus the tax compliance costs)
on interstate commerce until the amount of activity in the state is
profitable enough to cover the compliance costs. From this conclusion
arises the compliance burden theory. The theory requires the dormant
Commerce Clause nexus requirement to target tax compliance costs,21
rather than simply collapsing into the due process personal jurisdiction
standard. The answer to Justice Sotomayor’s question—“[s]o how
many sales does it take?”—is that it depends on how profitable the
sales are and how difficult the state tax is to comply with.
This Article makes the case for aligning the dormant Commerce
Clause nexus doctrine with the compliance burden theory in order to
ensure that interstate commerce is appropriately protected from the
burdens of state taxes. First, Part I provides the necessary background
to understand the challenges and opportunities that the historical
dormant Commerce Clause nexus case law presents for developing the
nexus doctrine in this way. That discussion culminates in an
exploration of the crossroads at which Wayfair has left the dormant
Commerce Clause nexus doctrine.
Part II then maps out in detail the compliance burden theory and
the standard that follows from that theory before Part III provides the
path forward for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine. This
path forward is illustrated by looking ahead to litigation expected to
spawn from the questions left unanswered by Wayfair. For instance,
many states are expanding their sales tax collection laws to apply to
marketplaces, such as Amazon Marketplace and eBay, that connect
19

See infra note 179.
See infra note 180.
21
Other commentators have reached a similar conclusion pre-Wayfair. See
Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach To Nexus Under The Dormant
Commerce Clause, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 110-12 (2018) (discussing
dormant Commerce Clause issues presented by cumulative tax compliance burdens);
David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of
E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 497 (2012) (“[T]he burden on interstate
commerce that troubled the Court in Quill arises solely from the potential for remote
vendors to be subject to excess tax compliance costs”); John A. Swain, State Sales
and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-First
Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 361-64 (2003) (arguing for the Quill Court’s concern
with cumulative tax compliance burdens on multistate taxpayers). However, those
commentators’ analysis differs from that in this Article because they argue that the
substantial nexus requirement is concerned with the cumulative burden of multiple
taxing jurisdictions placing tax compliance costs on interstate commerce, whereas
this Article argues that such cumulative burdens are not the proper focus of the
substantial nexus requirement. See infra notes 185-192 and accompanying text.
20
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vendors to consumers. Anticipated challenges to these unprecedented
expansions of state tax power provide opportunities to build on
Wayfair by articulating a clearer dormant Commerce Clause nexus
standard than Wayfair did. In addition, the South Dakota statute at
issue in Wayfair, which has served as the model for other states, is
drafted in such a way as to perfectly tee up the question of what
connection the dormant Commerce Clause requires between the taxing
state and the activity taxed. Potential litigation over a South Dakotatype statute is thus an ideal avenue for bringing the dormant Commerce
Clause nexus doctrine in line with the compliance burden theory.
Those readers versed in state taxation may be surprised to find no
mention of the term “substantial nexus” in this Introduction up to this
point.22 The reason for this omission is that this Article argues that,
while the dormant Commerce Clause imposes a threshold
jurisdictional restriction on states, that restriction comes from the
dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition of undue burdens on
interstate commerce and is not dependent on that term.23 In fact, others
have forcefully argued that the “substantial nexus” term is hollow and
should be abandoned.24 This Article takes the position that the term,
whether meaningless before Wayfair or not, provides a clear place to
locate the dormant Commerce Clause’s threshold jurisdictional
inquiry.25 However, because that inquiry derives from the dormant
Commerce Clause’s restriction on undue burdens, it is admittedly not
necessary to cabin it in the existing terminology that pervades state tax
jurisprudence; if the term “substantial nexus” is abandoned, the
analysis of state tax actions proposed in this Article would remain
necessary.
With the case for a dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine
which meaningfully focuses on tax compliance costs having been laid
out, Part IV concludes. The Wayfair case marks a high point for
coherence in the evolution of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus
doctrine and presents an opportunity for continued growth. As this
Article demonstrates, this opportunity must be seized upon rather than
risk harms to interstate commerce resulting from an unclear and
untargeted dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard.
I.

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS AND WAYFAIR

When a state attempts to impose a tax, the first legal question is
often “is there nexus?” “Nexus” is a term of art in the state tax
22
According to the Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 311 (1992), the dormant Commerce Clause requires a “substantial nexus” with
the taxing state before the state may impose tax on someone or something. See infra
notes 37-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the “substantial nexus” term.
23
See Part II, infra.
24
See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 16.
25
See Part III, infra.
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jurisprudence which refers to the constitutionally-sufficient
connection a state needs with the thing it would like to subject to tax.26
Without the appropriate nexus, the state lacks the power to tax. As
straightforward as the basic concept may seem, nexus doctrine has
developed into a complex muddle. This Part first provides an overview
of the law on nexus and then turns to how Wayfair affected that law,
all to provide the necessary background for the analysis that follows.
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus before Wayfair
During most of the historical state tax jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court recognized that the U.S. Constitution imposed a nexus
requirement on state taxes but located that requirement in the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause together.27 As a result, cases
appeared to turn on different applications of the nexus requirement;
some applications bent more towards due process fairness and notice
rationales while others bent more towards preventing undue burdens
on interstate commerce.28 The resulting “quagmire” of law did not go
unnoticed by the Court.29
In 1992’s Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,30 the Supreme Court
addressed this quagmire by engaging in the unprecedented splitting of
the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause analyses
of nexus.31 According to the Quill Court, this split was appropriate
because of the different natures of the inquiries under each clause.32
As explained in Quill, the Due Process Clause demands that a
taxing state have nexus with the person it seeks to tax.33 The basic
rationales for the due process nexus requirement are to ensure the
fundamental fairness of state taxation and to ensure that the taxpayer
has notice of the state’s tax jurisdiction over her.34 This due process
26

See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 5, at 555.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (“[A]lthough we have
not always been precise in distinguishing between the two, the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.”) see also Pomp, supra note 18,
at 1149 (“Prior to Quill, the Court never had any reason to specify whether a nexus
decision was grounded on one clause or the other.”).
28
See, e.g., infra note 57 (comparing two cases with similar fact patterns which
were decided by invoking different constitutional concerns).
29
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-16 (“[O]ur law in this area is something of a
‘quagmire’ and the ‘application of constitutional principles to specific state statutes
leaves much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise
guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.’”) citing
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58
(1959).
30
Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
31
Id. at 313. For a thorough analysis of the Quill decision and its flaws, see
Pomp, supra note 18, at 1141-54.
32
Quill, 504 U.S. at 305-06.
33
Id. at 312.
34
Id. at 312.
27
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nexus requirement is satisfied, the Supreme Court has explained, when
the taxpayer purposefully avails itself of the state’s marketplace and
the state provides some benefit in return to the taxpayer.35 For the most
part, the due process nexus standard maps on to the due process
standard for personal jurisdiction, which looks to whether the person
has “minimum contacts” with the state.36 Although the due process
nexus requirement is not the focus of this Article, it does provide an
important contrast to the nexus requirement of the dormant Commerce
Clause.
According to the Quill Court, the dormant Commerce Clause
requires something different from the Due Process Clause: a
“substantial nexus.”37 The Quill Court gleaned this substantial nexus
requirement from the 1977 Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady case,38
but it was not clear that the Complete Auto Court thought the term
“substantial nexus” had legal significance. The term first appeared in
the tax case law in Complete Auto,39 and the Complete Auto Court
casually interchanged “substantial nexus” with the term “sufficient
nexus” throughout the opinion.40
Despite the term’s history, the Quill Court did little to clarify the
meaning of “substantial nexus”—so little that some commentators
have argued that the term should be recognized as problematic and
abandoned.41 However, the Court did offer an explanation of the
driving force behind this dormant Commerce Clause nexus
requirement: “structural concerns about the effects of state regulation
on the national economy.”42 For the first time in the jurisprudence, the
35

See Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and
Take of State Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 371, 402-04 (2017) (fully exploring the
requirements of the due process nexus).
36
Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-08 (finding that due process nexus considerations are
“comparable” to due process personal jurisdiction considerations).
37
Id. at 311 (“[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so
long as the ‘tax . . . is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State . . . .’”) (emphasis added).
38
Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
39
Pomp, supra note 18, at 1147.
40
Compare Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (“These decisions . . . have sustained
a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with
a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State.”) with Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285 (“[T]he Court held that net income
from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state
taxation, provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local
activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the tax.”); see
also Pomp, supra note 18, at 1147.
41
See Pomp, supra note 18, at 1144-45 (arguing that the “substantial nexus”
term is problematic in part because the term was not intended to have the meaning
ascribed to it by the Quill Court, which utilized the term as a tool for the Court to
split the nexus analysis to allow Congress to overturn the physical presence rule).
42
Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
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Court explicitly set the dormant Commerce Clause limitations on state
tax power apart from those of the Due Process Clause.43 The Court
also observed that the standards are “not identical” and that “while a
State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority
to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless
violate the Commerce Clause.”44
Finally, the Quill Court appeared to effectively recognize two
aspects of this dormant Commerce Clause substantial nexus
requirement by asking whether the “tax is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State” but by examining whether the
taxpayer had a physical presence in the taxing state.45 This Article
refers to these two aspects of the substantial nexus requirement
respectively as “personal nexus”—nexus with the taxpayer—and
“transactional nexus”—nexus with the activity taxed.46 The following
chart provides a visual summary of the various nexus requirements
discussed above:47

43

See supra note 31.
Quill, 504 U.S. at 305, 312-13. Many commentators have argued that the
substantial nexus standard should not impose a higher bar on states than the due
process nexus standard. See, e.g., Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of Nexus in
State and Local Taxation, 67 TAX LAW. 623, 630 (2014) (“If the Due Process Clause
requires certain minimum contacts with a state, the Commerce Clause does not
require a greater number of contacts.”); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise
of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 157, 188-91 (2012) (discussing the
“gratuitous elevation of the Commerce Clause over the Due Process Clause”); Jesse
H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The
Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 213 (1998) (“We do not
interpret the Commerce Clause to require a separate nexus more stringent than that
imposed by the Due Process Clause because that is not required to further protect
interstate commerce against state taxes that accord a preference to local
enterprises.”).
45
Compare Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing the Complete Auto test, which includes
the transactional nexus requirement, with approval) with Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18
(upholding the requirement that the taxpayer have a physical presence in the taxing
state in order to create substantial nexus); see also Holderness, supra note 18, at 33031.
46
See supra note 12.
47
As the following discussion lays bare, the nexus concepts are not neat and
tidy. Readers should be cautious of allowing the tidiness of this chart to bleed into
their understanding of the nexus concepts. Instead, the chart offers a high-level view
of the types of nexus issues that have arisen in the jurisprudence; often it is difficult
to carve out the limits of the nexus issues or to avoid overlap of the issues.
44
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Tax Jurisdiction

Due Process
Clause

Dormant
Commerce Clause

Substantial Nexus

Nexus
(akin to personal
jurisdiction)

Personal Nexus
(nexus with the
taxpayer)

Transactional
Nexus (nexus with
the activity taxed)

The following two subsections separately explore the history
behind the personal nexus and transactional nexus aspects of the
substantial nexus requirement in order to provide the background
necessary to evaluate the impact of Wayfair on the dormant Commerce
Clause nexus doctrine.
1. Personal Nexus
Although the personal nexus aspect of the substantial nexus
requirement was first explicitly recognized in Quill,48 the roots of the
aspect are found in pre-Quill case law,49 particularly 1967’s National
Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois.50 In Bellas Hess, the
Supreme Court considered whether Illinois had the authority to require
an out-of-state vendor to collect sales and use taxes on mail order sales
to the state’s residents.51 The company had no physical location or
employees in the state, accepted the orders outside of the state, and
delivered them into the state through common carrier.52 The

48

Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-18 (discussing the personal nexus requirement).
Prior to Quill, the Court’s tendency to refer to both the Due Process Clause
and the dormant Commerce Clause together when discussing nexus obscured the
source of the personal nexus requirement, and it might have been argued that such
connections were solely due process concerns. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t
of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 356-58 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part, concurring
in part) (arguing that both the origin states and market states in the Dilworth and
General Trading Co. cases should have jurisdiction to tax under the due process
clause, and that the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with more substantive
effects of the taxes at issue). Such arguments continued to be made after Quill. Pomp
cautions against such arguments given the lack of clarity from the decisions. Pomp,
supra note 18, at 1149-50.
50
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
51
Id. at 754. Pomp provides an expert dissection of the Bellas Hess case in
Pomp, supra note 18, at 1133-40.
52
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754-55.
49
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company’s only arguable physical presence in Illinois appeared to be
the catalogues that it mailed to potential customers.53
Considering these facts, the Bellas Hess Court declared that:
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use
tax burdens on [National Bellas Hess] in this case, we
would have to repudiate totally the sharp distinction
which these and other decisions have drawn between
mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or
property within a State, and those who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or
common carrier as part of a general interstate business.
But this basic distinction, which until now has been
generally recognized by the state taxing authorities, is
a valid one, and we decline to obliterate it.54
In this way, the Bellas Hess Court expressed a concern that a taxpayer
have a connection with the taxing state—that personal nexus exist. By
drawing a line between mail order vendors and brick and mortar
retailers, the Court indicated that the personal nexus requirement could
be, and perhaps must be, satisfied by the physical presence of the
taxpayer.55
Although it is risky to characterize pre-Quill nexus decisions as
addressing due process requirements or dormant Commerce Clause
requirements because the cases rarely addressed the clauses
separately,56 the dormant Commerce Clause concerns underpinning
the Bellas Hess decision are clear.57 In reaching its decision, the Bellas
53

Id.
Id. at 758.
55
The Bellas Hess’ Court’s view of the taxpayer’s physical presence as a
necessary condition for personal nexus is unclear because the Court relied on cases
where the taxpayer was physically present in the taxing state for its position in Bellas
Hess. See Holderness, supra note 18, at 353 (explaining that the Bellas Hess Court
appropriately observed that its prior decisions had not found personal nexus with a
taxpayer lacking a physical presence in the state but failed to contextualize this
observation by noting that all but one of those decisions involved taxpayers
physically present in the taxing states).
56
Pomp, supra note 18, at 1149-50.
57
Bellas Hess may be characterized as expressing dormant Commerce Clause
concerns by comparing it to another case with similar substantive facts, Miller
Brothers Company v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). Miller Brothers involved
Maryland’s effort to require a Delaware-based store to collect Maryland’s use tax on
products the store sold to Maryland residents in Maryland. As relevant here, the
Miller Brothers business had no physical location or employees in Maryland,
accepted the orders in question in Delaware, and delivered them into the state
through common carrier. The relevant difference between Miller Brothers and Bellas
Hess is that the Miller Brothers were found not to have systematically exploited the
Maryland marketplace, unlike National Bellas Hess’ efforts to make sales into
Illinois. Compare Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 347 (“Here was no invasion or
exploitation of the consumer market in Maryland.”) with Bellas Hess, 368 U.S. at
54
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Hess Court observed that the “many variations in rates of tax, in
allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping
requirements could entangle [National Bellas Hess’] interstate
business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local
jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose ‘a fair share of the cost
of the local government.’”58 This concern for the burden on National
Bellas Hess’ interstate business echoed the concerns of the dormant
Commerce Clause, not the notice and fairness concerns of the Due
Process Clause.59
In 1992, Quill advanced the personal nexus doctrine from Bellas
Hess in a number of ways. After explicitly separating the substantial
nexus requirement from the due process nexus requirement and
articulating the personal nexus aspect of substantial nexus,60 the Quill
Court clarified that the physical presence rule it derived from Bellas
Hess—a taxpayer must have a physical presence in a state before the
state can require it to collect sales and use taxes61—was housed under
the dormant Commerce Clause personal nexus aspect.62

754-55 (“Twice a year catalogues are mailed to the company’s active or recent
customers throughout the Nation, including Illinois. This mailing is supplemented
by advertising ‘flyers’ which are occasionally mailed to past and potential
customers.”).
Because of Miller Brothers’ lack of exploitation of the Maryland marketplace,
the Court held that Maryland had no tax jurisdiction over the business and further
stated that “we need not consider whether the statute imposes an unjustifiable burden
upon interstate commerce.” Thus, viewed in today’s terms, the Miller Brothers
decision not only invoked due process standards of purposeful availment in reaching
its decision, it also specifically stated that the dormant Commerce Clause inquiry
was moot. Miller Brothers must be understood as a due process nexus case. In
contrast, the Bellas Hess Court could not have relied solely on due process
considerations to deny Illinois’ jurisdiction over the taxpayer because National
Bellas Hess was actively exploiting the Illinois marketplace.
One difficulty in comparing the two cases is that the Miller Brothers Company
did target Maryland customers in similar ways as National Bellas Hess targeted
Illinois customers. See Bellas Hess, 368 U.S. at 758 (“[In Miller Bros.,] the seller
advertised its wares to Maryland residents through newspaper and radio advertising,
in addition to mailing circulars four times a year. As a result, it made substantial sales
to Maryland customers, and made deliveries to them by its own trucks and drivers.”).
To accept the point made here in this Article, one must accept the Miller Brothers
Court’s questionable legal determination that there was no exploitation of the
Maryland market by the store. The Bellas Hess Court did not make such a finding in
its decision and strangely attempted to distinguish the Miller Brothers conclusion as
being about how much of the commerce was interstate commerce. See Bellas Hess,
368 U.S. at 759.
For further dissection of the Miller Brothers case, the faults within it, and what
might have been, see Pomp, supra note 18, at 1121-32.
58
Bellas Hess, 386 U. S. at 759-760.
59
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (detailing the
concerns of the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause).
60
See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
61
Quill, 504 U.S. at 317.
62
Id. at 318.
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Perhaps most important to the post-Wayfair world, the Quill Court
also articulated the different motivations for the two nexus inquires.
The Court explained that “the ‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not,
like due process’ ‘minimum contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice,
but rather a means for limiting state burdens on interstate
commerce.”63 In a footnote, the Court described how a tax might
unduly burden interstate commerce:
[A]bsent the [physical presence] rule, a publisher who
included a subscription card in three issues of its
magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements were
heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a
corporation whose telephone sales force made three
calls into the State, all would be subject to the [use tax]
collection duty. What is more significant, similar
obligations might be imposed by the Nation's 6,000plus taxing jurisdictions.64
In short, tax obligations resulting from small connections with the
taxing state troubled the Court, as did the potential for such obligations
to spread across the country if North Dakota’s law was upheld.
However, the underlying nature of the Court’s concerns remained
somewhat obscure after Quill. Perhaps the administrative costs to an
interstate taxpayer of complying with tax regimes were at the core of
the concerns,65 or perhaps the Court was anxious about the overall tax
burden that might fall to interstate taxpayers if the personal nexus
standard was loosened.66 The Court would provide no further guidance
until Wayfair.67
2. Transactional Nexus
Transactional nexus has a longer, though perhaps quieter, history
in the case law than personal nexus. The best place to start when
uncovering the transactional nexus requirement is with the 1944
63

Id. at 313.
Id. at 313 n.6.
65
See id.; National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753,
759-60 (1967).
66
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-16 (“Undue burdens on interstate commerce may
be avoided not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the actual burdens imposed by
particular regulations or taxes, but also, in some situations, by the demarcation of a
discrete realm of commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation.”); Bellas
Hess, 386 U.S. at 759 (“And if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon
National were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its
interstate business would be neither imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose
such burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with
power to impose sales and use taxes.”).
67
See Holderness, supra note 18, at 315-16 (observing that the Supreme Court
rejected certiorari in all challenges to the physical presence rule after Quill and until
Wayfair).
64
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companion cases of McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.68 and General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa69. In these cases, the
Supreme Court considered nearly identical fact patterns: an out-ofstate vendor sold to residents of the taxing state and the products sold
were delivered into the state from out of state by common carrier.70
The only relevant difference in the Court’s view was that in Dilworth,
Arkansas demanded that the vendor collect a sales tax imposed on the
sales transactions,71 and in General Trading Co., Iowa demanded that
the vendor collect a use tax imposed on the in-state use of the products
originally sold in Minnesota.72
Because the states imposed different taxes, the cases reached
different results. Though personal nexus arguably existed with respect
to each out-of-state vendor, Arkansas could not require the vendor to
collect its sales tax,73 but Iowa was permitted require the vendor to
collect its use tax.74 Transactional nexus was at the core of these
decisions; in Dilworth, Arkansas simply lacked a sufficient connection
with the sales it sought to tax because they were consummated outside
of the state (i.e., there was no local sale for Arkansas to tax), whereas
in General Trading Co., Iowa had such a connection with the in-state
use of the products sold.75 It did not matter to the Court that sales and
68

McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
70
Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328; General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 337.
71
Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 327 (“We are asked to reverse a decision of the Supreme
Court of Arkansas holding that the Commerce Clause precludes liability for the sales
tax of that State upon the transactions to be set forth.”).
72
General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 336 (“The question now presented is, in
short, whether Iowa may collect, in the circumstances of this case, such a use tax
from General Trading Company, a Minnesota corporation, on the basis of property
bought from Trading Company and sent by it from Minnesota to purchasers in Iowa
for use and enjoyment there.”). Although sales taxes and use taxes are formally
imposed on separate transactions, they have largely been thought of as economically
equivalent taxes on consumption. See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 18, at 347 (2018);
Charles E. McLure Jr., State/Local Taxes on Interstate Commerce: Legitimacy and
Fairness, 93 TAX NOTES 7703 ¶¶ 9-16 (2001). The use tax is often framed as merely
a backstop to the sales tax, necessary only because of the historically limited
jurisdictional reach of sales taxes. See RICHARD D. POMP, STATE & LOCAL
TAXATION, at 6-40 to 6-44 (9th ed., 2019); see also Paul J. Hartman, Sales Taxation
in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND. L. REV. 138, 165 (1956); Robert C. Brown, The
Future of Use Taxes, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 504 (1941).
73
Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“For Arkansas to impose a tax on such transaction
would be to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate
transaction.”).
74
General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338 (observing “the right of Iowa . . . to
exact a use tax from purchasers on mail order goods forwarded into Iowa from
without the State.”).
75
Compare Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“We would have to destroy both business
and legal notions to deny that under these circumstances the sale—the transfer of
ownership—was made in Tennessee.”) with General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338
(“The tax is what it professes to be—a non-discriminatory excise laid on all personal
property consumed in Iowa. The property is enjoyed by an Iowa resident partly
because the opportunity is given by Iowa to enjoy property no matter whence
69
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use taxes are complementary and often reach the same economic
result.76
In what would turn out to be a highly influential opinion to the
Quill Court,77 Justice Rutledge penned a partial dissent, partial
concurrence that addressed both the Dilworth and General Trading
Co. cases.78 In his opinion, Justice Rutledge argued that there was no
room for a nexus inquiry under the dormant Commerce Clause.79 In
his view, issues of state tax jurisdiction were due process concerns,
and the dormant Commerce Clause should be setting rules of tax
priority between multiple states that have jurisdiction over the activity
taxed.80 Therefore, he believed both Arkansas and Iowa had nexus
with the consumption they sought to tax through their respective sales
tax and use tax, and he rejected the opposing outcomes of the Dilworth
and General Trading Co. cases as based on formalistic distinctions.81
Justice Rutledge argued that the dormant Commerce Clause would
provide a remedy only once interstate consumption was subject to
higher cumulative tax burdens than intrastate consumption, and that
that remedy would be to prioritize the market state’s right to tax over
that of the origin state.82

acquired. The exaction is made against the ultimate consumer—the Iowa resident
who is paying taxes to sustain his own state government.”); see also Nelson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941) (“The fact that under Iowa law the sale is
made outside of the state does not mean that the power of Iowa ‘has nothing on which
to operate.’ The purchaser is in Iowa and the tax is upon use in Iowa. The validity of
such a tax, so far as the purchaser is concerned, ‘has been withdrawn from the arena
of debate.’”) (internal citations omitted).
76
Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“A sales tax and a use tax in many instances may
bring about the same result. But they are different in conception, are assessments
upon different transactions, and in the interlacings of the two legislative authorities
within our federation may have to justify themselves on different constitutional
grounds.”).
77
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1992) (quoting Justice
Rutledge’s opinion before proceeding to “[h]eed[] Justice Rutledge’s counsel, [and]
consider each constitutional limit in turn.”).
78
Justice Rutledge’s opinion was filed in the case of International Harvester
Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944), which was a third companion case to
Dilworth and General Trading Co.
79
Int’l Harvester, at 356-58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part)
(arguing that both the origin states and market states in the Dilworth and General
Trading Co. cases should have jurisdiction to tax under the due process clause, and
that the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with more substantive effects of the
taxes at issue).
80
Id. at 359.
81
Id. at 352 (“The only other difference is in the terms used by Iowa and
Arkansas, respectively, to describe their taxes. . . . Other things being the same,
constitutionality should not turn on whether one name or the other is applied by the
state.”).
82
Id. at 361 (“If in this case it were necessary to choose between the state of
origin and that of market for the exercise of exclusive power to tax, or for requiring
allowance of credit in order to avoid the cumulative burden, in my opinion the choice
should lie in favor of the state of market rather than the state of origin.”).
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By articulating different motivations behind the requirements of
the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause in the state
tax context and analyzing those requirements separately, Justice
Rutledge’s opinion laid groundwork for the split of the due process
and dormant Commerce Clause analyses in Quill.83 However, when
the Quill Court made that split, it failed to also adopt Justice Rutledge’s
position that the dormant Commerce Clause did not contain a nexus
requirement. Instead, the Quill Court appeared to incorporate the
transactional nexus requirement into the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis by claiming that “we will sustain a tax against a Commerce
Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State . . . .’”84
Dilworth and General Trading Co. offer a rare source for
discerning the demands of this transactional nexus requirement
because usually there is no controversy around whether transactional
nexus exists. For example, no transactional nexus issue existed in Quill
because the activity taxed clearly took place in the taxing state.85 The
development of the transactional nexus doctrine has thus been subtler
than that of the personal nexus doctrine, as only a few cases have
offered sparse additional insight into the transactional nexus
requirement.
In the 1951 case of Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of
Illinois,86 the taxpayer was a manufacturer based in Massachusetts that
had established an office and warehouse in Illinois. The taxpayer made
local retail sales out of the office and also made mail order sales out of
its Massachusetts establishments. The taxpayer argued that those mail
order sales could not be included in its Illinois tax base because they
were made in interstate commerce.87 Though the idea that interstate
commerce cannot be subject to state taxation has since been
abandoned, the Court denied the taxpayer’s challenge because the
Illinois office performed multiple functions in the state relating to the
mail order sales.88
In reaching its decision and important to the transactional nexus
concept, the Court observed that “[u]nless some local incident occurs
sufficient to bring the transaction within its taxing power, the vendor
is not taxable.”89 The Court cited Dilworth for this position. Further,
83

See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1992).
Id. at 311.
85
See id. at 301 (“This case . . . involves a State’s attempt to require an out-ofstate mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State
to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.”) (emphasis
added).
86
Norton Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
87
Id. at 535-36.
88
Id. at 538-39.
89
Id. at 537
84
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the Court stated that when a taxpayer “has gone into the State to do
local business by state permission and has submitted itself to the taxing
power of the State, it can avoid taxation on some Illinois sales only by
showing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local
business and interstate in nature.”90 Though the Norton Court couched
its analysis in terms of whether an activity was local or interstate in
nature, the decision indicates that an activity must have some local
connection to a state before the state can tax it—transactional nexus is
required.
In the 1989 case of Goldberg v. Sweet,91 the Court considered
whether Illinois could impose an excise tax on telecommunications
that originated or terminated in the state and were charged to a service
address in the state.92 Although the Court initially dismissed
transactional nexus concerns as moot,93 it later returned to the question
with brief, but somewhat illuminating, dicta as it discussed concerns
about multiple taxation:94
We doubt that States through which the telephone call’s
electronic signals merely pass have a sufficient nexus
to tax that call. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410
U.S. 623, 631 (1973) (State has no nexus to tax an
airplane based solely on its flight over the State);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,
302-304 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) (same). We
also doubt that termination of an interstate telephone
call, by itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for
a State to tax a call. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)
(receipt of mail provides insufficient nexus).
We believe that only two States have a nexus
substantial enough to tax a consumer’s purchase of an
interstate telephone call. The first is a State like Illinois
which taxes the origination or termination of an
interstate telephone call charged to a service address
within that State. The second is a State which taxes the
origination or termination of an interstate telephone call
billed or paid within that State.95

90

Id.
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
92
Id. at 254-57.
93
Id. at 260 (“As all parties agree that Illinois has a substantial nexus with the
interstate telecommunications reached by the Tax Act, we begin our inquiry with
apportionment, the second prong of the Complete Auto test.”).
94
Id. at 262-63.
95
Id. at 263.
91

18

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314272

While the Court did not expand on why it held the nexus beliefs it
articulated, this dicta demonstrates that the transactional nexus aspect
demands some local hook for the activity taxed beyond its simple
beginning, end, and location. The importance of a local billing or
service address to a telephone call is unclear, but such an address may
indicate to the Court’s satisfaction that tax compliance is not too
burdensome because some familiarity exists between the local
taxpayers and the taxing state’s tax system. Alternatively, the
administrative near-impossibility of taxing telecommunications based
on the location of the signals may have caused the Court to fear that if
a state like Illinois was not permitted to tax the telecommunications,
no state would be able to, effectively shielding the interstate activities
from state taxation and setting the clock back on the state taxation of
interstate commerce.96
In 1995’s Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,97 the
Supreme Court considered whether Oklahoma could impose its sales
tax on the full value of bus tickets sold in Oklahoma for interstate
travel.98 Relying on Goldberg and earlier cases, the Court had no
difficulty proclaiming that Oklahoma had “nexus aplenty” with the
sales, thus no transactional nexus controversy existed.99 Jefferson
Lines advanced the transactional nexus doctrine by clarifying that the
inquiry is not a means of prioritizing different states’ tax claims, rather
it is a simple threshold connection question.100
Although transactional nexus issues have not surfaced at the
Supreme Court level with much frequency, numerous lower courts
have addressed the transactional nexus requirement, often citing to

96

Thanks to Rick Pomp for bringing this concern to my attention. See infra note
169 for cases rejecting state tax immunity for interstate commerce.
97
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
98
Id. at 177.
99
Id. at 184.
100
Id. (“[T]he taxpayer does not deny Oklahoma’s substantial nexus to the
instate portion of the bus service, but rather argues that nexus to the State is
insufficient as to the portion of travel outside its borders. This point, however, goes
to the second prong of Complete Auto . . . .”). The full dormant Commerce Clause
test relied on in Quill derives from the Complete Auto case and is referred to as the
“Complete Auto test.” The second prong of the test demands that a tax be fairly
apportioned to the amount of activity occurring in the taxing state. See infra note 154
and accompanying text for a full description of the Complete Auto test.
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Dilworth.101 Thus, the transactional nexus requirement was alive and
well, though underdeveloped and undertheorized, pre-Wayfair.102
Heading into Wayfair then, states and taxpayers were faced with a
dysfunctional physical presence rule for personal nexus and a
conclusory transactional nexus standard that had created highly
formalistic distinctions regarding state tax jurisdiction. Hopes were
high that the Supreme Court would introduce more coherence into the
substantial nexus doctrine by abandoning the physical presence rule
and the formalism in the transactional nexus doctrine. As detailed in
the next section, Wayfair partially delivered on these hopes by
delivering a narrow opinion which discarded the physical presence rule
but left the greater dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine
unsettled.
B. Wayfair: Substantial Nexus at a Crossroads
As the evolutions of the personal nexus and the transactional nexus
doctrines demonstrate, the dormant Commerce Clause’s substantial
nexus jurisprudence is, at a minimum, complex. Much of the
complexity was created by undertheorized expressions of the need for
the substantial nexus requirement, which led to analytically
unsatisfying conclusions about when such nexus existed.
As this section explains, 2018’s Wayfair decision brought a
measure of coherence to the personal nexus doctrine but failed to
address transactional nexus issues or the substantial nexus doctrine
more broadly. In so doing, the case brought the substantial nexus
doctrine into the twenty-first century but left it at a crossroads: the
doctrine can either wither away by collapsing into the due process
personal jurisdiction standard or it can be strengthened into a coherent
standard that addresses the concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The next Part then argues for the latter path by developing a robust

101
See, e.g., Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900, 908 (Ohio 2016); Irwin
Naturals v. Dep’t of Revenue, 382 P.3d 689, 693 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016);
Travelocity.com LP v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 329 P.3d 131, 148 (Wyo. 2014);
Travelscape, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 705 S.E.2d 28, 37 (S.C. 2011); TA Operating
Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 767 So. 2d 1270, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
General Motors Corp. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 990 P.2d 59, 66 (Colo. 1999); World
Book, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 590 N.W.2d 293, 297-98 (Mich. 1999); State v.
Dorhout, 513 N.W.2d 390, 393 (S.D. 1994); Koch Fuels, Inc. v. State ex rel.
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 862 P.2d 471, 476-77 (Okla. 1993); Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 839 P.2d 303, 308 (Utah 1992).
102
See authorities cited supra note 101; see also Gamage & Heckman, supra
note 21, at 490 (“Together, [Dilworth and General Trading Co.] established a
dichotomy between sales and use taxes that remains in effect to this day: purchases
that occur within a state may be subject to sales taxation while purchases from remote
vendors may only be subject to use taxation.”).
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theory of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement to guide
the doctrine forward.
1. A Vague Personal Nexus Standard
Wayfair was a case about the physical presence rule for personal
nexus.103 The case came about in an interesting manner. In response to
a concurrence by Justice Kennedy in a 2015 case in which the Justice
offered a scathing critique of the physical presence rule, 104 South
Dakota passed a law which explicitly disregarded the rule for purposes
of sales tax collection obligations in the state.105 Instead, the South
Dakota law imposed a sales tax collection obligation on any vendor
who collected gross receipts of more than $100,000 from sales to
South Dakotans or who made more than 200 individual sales to South
Dakotans in the prior year, whether or not the vendor had a physical
presence in the state.106 Remote vendors were thus targeted for new
sales tax collection obligations.
A handful of those remote vendors—Wayfair, Overstock, and
Newegg.com—refused to comply with the South Dakota law and
challenged its constitutionality.107 The South Dakota courts agreed
with the remote vendors,108 and the South Dakota Department of
Revenue offered little resistance.109 Instead, the Department focused
its efforts on convincing the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the long
standing physical presence rule.110 Thus, the briefings and decisions
along the way to the Supreme Court were narrowly focused on whether
South Dakota’s law unconstitutionally imposed tax on people lacking

103

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087-88 (2018).
Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134-35 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy was far from alone in his critique of the physical
presence rule. See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 18, at 331-39 (critiquing the physical
presence rule’s ability to target undue burdens on interstate commerce); Pomp, supra
note 18, at 1145-46; Swain, supra note 21, at 361-64.
105
S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2; see S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-1 (providing
legislative findings regarding the need to enact a law disregarding the physical
presence rule including “the general growth of online retail” eroding the state’s sales
tax base and “the [falling] costs of [use tax] collection . . . [g]iven modern computing
and software options,” as well as noting that the “argument [for requiring remote
sellers to collect use taxes] has grown stronger, and the cause more urgent, with
time,” given these findings).
106
S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2.
107
See State v. Wayfair, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (D.S.D. 2017).
108
State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 760-61 (S.D. 2017) (holding S.D.
Codified Laws § 10-64-2 unconstitutional).
109
Id. at 760 (“The State filed a response to the motion for summary judgement
agreeing with Sellers’ statement of material facts. The State further agreed that the
court would have to grant Sellers’ motion for summary judgment based upon Bellas
Hess and Quill and indicated its intention to pursue review of the issue by the United
States Supreme Court.”).
110
Id.
104
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personal nexus with the state. To win, the state needed to prove that
anyone falling under its statute had personal nexus with the state.
Although the state achieved its narrow goal and the Supreme Court
discarded the physical presence rule,111 the Wayfair decision left the
personal nexus doctrine (and the greater substantial nexus doctrine) in
a vague state.112 Narrowly read, Wayfair stands only for the
proposition that a taxpayer’s physical presence is not necessary to
establish personal nexus with the taxing state.113 Broader readings hint
at how the Court views the role of both aspects of the substantial nexus
requirement more generally but do not provide clarity.114
After abandoning the physical presence rule, the Wayfair Court
proclaimed that personal nexus “is established when the taxpayer [or
collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on
business’ in that jurisdiction,”115 echoing the due process personal
jurisdiction standard.116 For this proposition, the Court only cited to
dicta from Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez,117 which was not
decided on dormant Commerce Clause grounds and in any event
involved oil tankers that were physically present in the taxing
jurisdiction.118 Polar Tankers provides little guidance for determining
when personal nexus exists if the taxpayer is not physically present in
the taxing state.
The Wayfair Court might have expanded on this “substantial
privilege” standard when deciding that Wayfair had satisfied it, but the
Court only offered the following explanation:
Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the
economic and virtual contacts respondents have with
the State. The Act applies only to sellers that deliver
more than $100,000 of goods or services into South
Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions
for the delivery of goods and services into the State on
111

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
See authorities cited supra note 16.
113
See Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Substantial Nexus, supra note 16, at
447 (“The Court’s ruling was very narrow, though, holding only that the physical
presence rule is no longer the governing standard for purposes of determining when
a taxpayer has the substantial nexus required under the Court’s Complete Auto
Transit Inc. v. Brady formulation.”).
114
Id. at 448.
115
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
116
The reference to the “substantial privilege of carrying on business” in the
taxing jurisdiction had been used by the Supreme Court in the state tax jurisprudence
before Wayfair, but only in discussions of due process limitations on state tax actions.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980); Wisconsin
v. JC Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940).
117
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009).
118
See Pomp, supra note 16, at 29; Fatale, supra note 16, at 868.
112
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an annual basis. This quantity of business could not
have occurred unless the seller availed itself of the
substantial privilege of carrying on business in South
Dakota. And respondents are large, national companies
that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual
presence. Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of
Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.119
Rather than explain what it means to avail oneself of the substantial
privilege of carrying on business in a jurisdiction, the Court simply
declared that Wayfair had done so because of the quantity of its
business with South Dakotans and the size and national scope of its
business. The Court may be correct, but how should smaller vendors
read this opinion? What if Wayfair sold only one $150,000 piece of
furniture to a South Dakotan? Or what if Wayfair sold $1.00 trinkets
to 200 separate South Dakotans? The Wayfair opinion did not
adequately answer these questions because it failed to articulate a
meaning behind the “substantial privilege of carrying on business”
phrase in the dormant Commerce Clause context.120
However, Wayfair did not leave the personal nexus standard and
the substantial nexus doctrine totally rudderless. The Wayfair Court
invoked dormant Commerce Clause concerns when it clarified that
compliance costs weigh heavily in the substantial nexus analysis:
The Quill majority expressed concern that without the
physical presence rule “a state tax might unduly burden
interstate commerce” by subjecting retailers to tax
collection obligations in thousands of different taxing
jurisdictions. But the administrative costs of
compliance, especially in the modern economy with its
Internet technology, are largely unrelated to whether a
company happens to have a physical presence in a
State. . . . In other words, under Quill, a small company
with diverse physical presence might be equally or
more burdened by compliance costs than a large remote
seller. The physical presence rule is a poor proxy for

119

Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
See Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 16, at 130 (“Post-Wayfair, the new
substantial nexus test turns on whether a taxpayer has availed itself of the substantial
privilege of carrying on business in the taxing jurisdiction at issue. In keeping with
tradition, the Court left the minimum threshold of this sufficiency test undefined, for
lower courts to determine. Because the substantial nexus analysis is fact-specific, the
only existing guidance for determining the sufficiency of the economic and virtual
contacts that satisfy this test are the particular South Dakota contacts of the
businesses involved in the Wayfair litigation.”).
120
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the compliance costs faced by companies that do
business in multiple States.121
The Court further homed in on its concern with tax compliance costs
by raising, with seeming approval, various aspects of the South Dakota
law: the thresholds protected small sellers, retroactive application of
the law was forbidden, and South Dakota was a member of the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement,122 which meant that the
state’s sales tax system had been simplified by adopting common
statutory language and administrative practices with other member
states.123
Even so, the Court raised those aspects after claiming that “[t]he
question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s
Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act. . . . That said,
South Dakota’s tax system includes several features that appear
designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon
interstate commerce.”124 Although the Wayfair Court was clearly
concerned with the compliance burdens placed on interstate taxpayers,
the Court failed to tie those concerns directly to its due-process-esque
personal nexus standard. Wayfair implied a need for the dormant
Commerce Clause personal nexus inquiry while simultaneously
seeming to collapse the personal nexus standard into a due process
standard which does not target that need.
2. A Lack of Transactional Nexus
For all the disruption it brought to the personal nexus doctrine,
Wayfair did little with respect to the transactional nexus doctrine. As
noted, the decision and the parties focused on the personal nexus issue.
However, the South Dakota law at issue in Wayfair required out-ofstate vendors to collect tax on sales to South Dakota residents.125
Under Dilworth, South Dakota likely lacks transactional nexus with
those sales and thus has no jurisdiction over them, regardless of its

121

Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 2099-2100.
123
See Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Governing Board, About Us,
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/about-us/about-sstgb; see also Wayfair, 138 S.
Ct. at 2099-2100.
124
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
125
S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
any seller . . . shall remit the sales tax . . . .”) (emphasis added); see Richard D. Pomp,
Wayfair: Its Implications and Missed Opportunities, 58 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y __
(forthcoming 2019); Hayes R. Holderness & Matthew C. Boch, Did South Dakota
Neglect Transactional Nexus in Its Bill to Kill Quill?, BLOOMBERG BNA TAX
MANAGEMENT WEEKLY STATE TAX REPORT (Dec. 6, 2017).]
122
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jurisdiction over the vendors themselves.126 Thus, a transactional
nexus issue lurked behind the Wayfair litigation.127
The parties to the Wayfair litigation did not raise the lurking
transactional nexus issue,128 and the Court effectively ignored the issue
by claiming without support that “[a]ll concede that taxing the sales in
question here is lawful”129 and “[a]ll agree that South Dakota has the
authority to tax these transactions.”130 While it is true that the use of
the sold products would be taxable, the sales themselves should not be.
This lack of attention to the transactional nexus issue is concerning—
the issue threatened to immunize those out-of-state sales from taxation
by South Dakota131—and open to interpretation.
A broad reading of Wayfair in this context may indicate that the
formalism of past jurisprudence is a bygone relic. The Court’s
description of everyone as agreeing that the sales were taxable and
cavalierly referring to both sales and use taxes as sales taxes
throughout the opinion both suggest that the Court viewed sales and
use taxes as equivalent taxes,132 at least in the context of the personal
nexus discussion. As personal nexus is not concerned with the activity
taxed, but rather with the taxpayer, this equivalence should be
uncontroversial—the potential taxpayers of both taxes are the
consumer and the vendor.133 The Court’s failure to go further and
distinguish the taxes on transactional nexus grounds might be viewed
as a repudiation of the Dilworth/General Trading Co. dichotomy.134
On the other hand, a more conservative reading of the Wayfair
decision indicates that the case is properly viewed solely as a personal
See supra note 73; see also Holderness & Boch, supra note 125 (“By limiting
the scope of the new economic nexus rule to sales taxes, South Dakota has put up an
additional hurdle in the way of the victory it desires. The state may find that even if
it wins on the physical presence issue, it will remain unable to tax the proceeds from
sales of products delivered into the state by common carrier, and additional
legislation will be necessary.”).
127
See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125; Pomp, supra note 125; Thimmesch,
Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, at 975-76.
128
See Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16,
at 976.
129
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
130
Id. at 2092.
131
Thus, there being no taxable transactions to collect tax on, Wayfair would
have no actual tax collection obligation. See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125.
132
See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, see also Thimmesch, Shanske, &
Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, at 976.
133
Holderness, supra note 18, at 320-21 (describing sales tax and use tax
collection regimes); Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra
note 16, at 976 (“Read in its entirety, Wayfair suggests that the Court viewed the
difference in the taxes as a difference in who remits them—sales taxes being
collected and remitted by vendors and use taxes being paid directly by consumers.”).
134
See Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16,
at 976 (considering, through rejecting, this implied repudiation of the
Dilworth/General Trading Co. dichotomy).
126
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nexus case, leaving intact the transactional nexus jurisprudence and
the Dilworth/General Trading Co. dichotomy.135 The parties did not
raise or brief the transactional nexus issue, and the Court did not raise
it sua sponte during any of the proceedings.136 The issue is not directly
mentioned in the decision.137 Referring to use taxes as sales taxes is a
common colloquial practice.138 Lower court decisions have continued
to rely on the historical transactional nexus doctrine,139 and Wayfair’s
indirect references to any transactional nexus issues in the case do not
engage with that historical doctrine. As with the personal nexus
doctrine, Wayfair leaves the transactional nexus doctrine in a vague
state: does it remain controlled by formalistic distinctions, or has a
more substantive analysis been allowed to creep in?140 The operation
of South Dakota’s law and taxpayer certainty depend on the answer to
this question.
3.

The Wayfair Crossroads

By shaking the traditional personal nexus analysis apart and failing
to address transactional nexus concerns, the Wayfair case leaves the
substantial nexus doctrine at a crossroads. Wayfair’s personal nexus
standard is vague and reminiscent of the due process personal
jurisdiction standard and does not clearly address the Court’s concern
for the burden that compliance costs associated with state taxes might
impose on interstate commerce.141 Likewise, the Court’s casual
dismissal of any transactional nexus concerns lurking in the case
135

See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088 (“The Court granted certiorari here to
reconsider the scope and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by those
cases.”); see also Holderness & Boch, supra note 125; Thimmesch, Shanske, &
Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16, at 976; Gamage & Heckman, supra
note 21, at 490.
136
See supra note 128.
137
See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
138
See Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 16,
at 976 (“Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s opinion explicitly noted that the South
Dakota statute imposed a sales tax collection obligation, but the reference seems to
have been more colloquial than technical.”); Andrew J. Haile, Sales Tax
Exceptionalism, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 136, 141 n. 12 (2013); JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN
& WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 12.01 (3rd ed.) (observing that the
term “sales tax” is often used to describe a large variety of taxes, including the use
tax).
139
See supra note 101.
140
See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125 (“If certiorari is granted, though, the
transactional nexus problem would be an opportunity for the Court to revisit and
refresh its relatively dated transactional nexus jurisprudence.”).
141
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099-2100 (approving the South Dakota law and
describing how it eased compliance burdens on taxpayers); see also Wayfair, 138 S.
Ct. at 2093 (“The Quill majority expressed concern that without the physical
presence rule ‘a state tax might unduly burden interstate commerce’ by subjecting
retailers to tax collection obligations in thousands of different taxing jurisdictions.
But the administrative costs of compliance, especially in the modern economy with
its Internet technology, are largely unrelated to whether a company happens to have
a physical presence in a State.”) (internal citations omitted).
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leaves the traditional formalistic transactional nexus standard in doubt.
By avoiding the transactional nexus issues, the Court also passed up
an opportunity to clarify the relationship between the personal and
transactional nexus aspects going forward.
As a result of all this vagueness and uncertainty, courts, states, and
taxpayers will have to navigate the crossroads at which Wayfair has
placed the substantial nexus doctrine. The dormant Commerce Clause
nexus standard could remain vague and collapse into the due process
personal jurisdiction standard or it could strengthen into a coherent
standard that protects interstate commerce in earnest from unduly
burdensome state tax actions. The former path could lead to uncertain
and burdensome tax obligations for interstate taxpayers, counselling in
favor of the latter path. As the next Part explains, a threshold nexus
requirement has the unique ability to support the United States’ system
of interstate commerce by protecting against unduly burdensome tax
compliance costs. Failing to realize this ability would leave interstate
commerce exposed to harmful state taxes; to avoid this possibility, the
next Part guides the substantial nexus doctrine towards a coherent
standard by developing the compliance burden theory of dormant
Commerce Clause nexus and the standard that follows from that
theory.
II.

SOUND DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS

As the discussion in Part I indicates, the dormant Commerce
Clause’s substantial nexus requirement has generated much
controversy and confusion over the course of its existence. Much of
the controversy stems from the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a
clear purpose for the requirement,142 leaving people to question the
role it has in preventing state tax actions from placing undue burdens
on interstate commerce. Indeed, many commentators have questioned
whether the nexus concept has any role to play in the dormant
Commerce Clause context, or whether nexus is more appropriately
considered only in the due process personal jurisdiction context.143
This Part develops a theory—the compliance burden theory—that
explains why nexus does have an important role to play in the dormant
Commerce Clause context. To develop the compliance burden theory,
this Part considers the types of burdens a state tax might impose on
interstate commerce and the ability of a threshold nexus requirement
to address those burdens. As the analysis demonstrates, such a

142

See supra Part I. But see supra note 18 (observing that commentators have
proposed theoretical justifications for the substantial nexus requirement).
143
See authorities cited supra note 44.
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requirement is uniquely situated to protect interstate commerce from
undue burdens from tax compliance costs.144
This Part then develops a coherent dormant Commerce Clause
nexus standard by relying on the compliance burden theory. This
standard focuses on whether tax compliance costs would compel
someone engaged in interstate commerce to avoid doing business in
the taxing state. The compliance burden theory and the nexus standard
that follows demonstrate dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine
can and should avoid collapsing into due process personal jurisdiction
doctrine.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Undue Burdens on
Interstate Commerce
One of the more important restraints on state actions, tax or
otherwise, is the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. As explained by
the Supreme Court, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine exists to
prevent the “economic Balkanization” of the states by prohibiting state
actions that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate
commerce.145 The Court has found that facially discriminatory state
actions are categorically unconstitutional under the dormant
Commerce Clause,146 so the most challenging legal issues arise in
assessing when a state action that is not facially discriminatory—like
imposing a general sales tax—nevertheless places an undue burden on
interstate commerce. Generally, a balancing test—referred to as the
“Pike balancing test”—is used to address these issues: a state action is
deemed to unduly burden interstate commerce when the burdens
placed on interstate commerce outweigh the state’s interest in taking
the action.147
However, the Pike balancing test has not found a clear home in the
state tax jurisprudence despite the Court’s recognition that a tax levied
on interstate commerce has the potential to unduly burden that

144
See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 497-503 (reaching a similar
conclusion).
145
E.g. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089, 2091; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995).
146
See e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (observing “a
virtually per se rule of invalidity” for laws that facially discriminate against interstate
commerce).
147
The Supreme Court has adopted “a two-tiered approach to analyzing state
economic regulation under the Commerce Clause.” Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.
v. New York State Liquor Auth., 467 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986). When a regulatory
measure “has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates
evenhandedly,” the Court applies a balancing analysis, looking to “whether the
State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly
exceeds the local benefits.” Id. at 579 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970)).
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commerce.148 Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall famously described
the power to tax as the power to destroy; taken to an extreme, a state
tax could destroy interstate commerce through death by taxation.149
The Pike balancing test’s absence from the state tax cases likely is a
result of the difficulties in quantifying a state’s significant interest150
in exercising the tax power,151 a power that often has been described
as fundamental.152
Deviating from the Pike balancing test, the modern state tax
doctrine instead relies on the Complete Auto test—derived from the
1977 Complete Auto case—to guide the analysis of the burden that a
state tax might impose on interstate commerce in a qualitative
manner.153 In full, the Complete Auto test requires that a “tax [1] is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2]
is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the
State” before the dormant Commerce Clause is satisfied.154 This
Article focuses on the nexus concept embedded in the first prong of
the test, but the other prongs become relevant when analyzing the role

148

E.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1992).
See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) (“That the power to tax
involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render
useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one
government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other,
with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts
the control, are propositions not to be denied.”).
150
E.g. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981)
(“[T]his Court has acknowledged that ‘a State has a significant interest in exacting
from interstate commerce its fair share of the cost of state government.’”) (internal
citations omitted).
151
Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 109-10 (articulating the difficulty of measuring
a state’s interest in imposing taxes); Fatale, supra note 16, at 873-74 (detailing the
difficulty of applying the Pike balancing test to tax matters).
152
See, e.g., Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Central Arkansas, 520 U.S.
821, 826 (1997) (“The power to tax is basic to the power of the State to exist.”);
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (referring to taxation as “the
most basic power of government”); State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs of Ind. v. Jackson, 283
U.S. 527, 537 (1931) (“The power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence
of the government of the states.”); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930)
(“The power of taxation is a fundamental and imperious necessity of all government,
not to be restricted by mere legal fictions.”).
153
See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018); see also
Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 107-08 (“Pike balancing is the Court’s way of
determining when state regulations, in the parlance of its precedential case, simply
‘go too far.’ That is where Pike seems to diverge from Complete Auto, because the
Court does not exercise a similarly broad oversight function in its tax cases. It does
not strike down state taxes because they are too high or because they result in
cumulative tax burdens. Rather, states are free to tax as they see fit as long as their
taxes are nondiscriminatory and are fairly apportioned. The one exception, of course,
is that states cannot go ‘too far’ in who they impose those burdens on.”).
154
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
149
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of a threshold nexus requirement in preventing undue burdens on
interstate commerce.
B. The Compliance Burden Theory of Dormant Commerce
Clause Nexus
Broadly speaking, three aspects of a state tax can create burdens
on interstate commerce: the tax rate; the tax base; and the tax
compliance costs. A tax rate that becomes too high, a tax base that is
incorrectly measured, or tax compliance costs that become too heavy
might lead to undue burdens. As the following subsections
demonstrate, the nexus concept—that threshold connection between
the taxing state and the interstate commerce taxed—offers weak
protections against potential undue burdens resulting from tax rates
and tax bases but offers strong protections against such burdens
resulting from tax compliance costs. Thus, protecting interstate
commerce from the undue burdens of tax compliance cost should drive
the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine.
1.

The Potential Undue Burdens of Too High Tax Rates

When thinking of an unduly burdensome tax, one might first
suspect that the tax rate is too high. However, a high tax rate, if dulyenacted though a state’s legitimate political process, is not inherently
problematic, as the Supreme Court has indicated.155 Because a state’s
interest in exercising its tax power is strong and difficult to quantify,
it is difficult to apply the traditional Pike balancing test to determine

155

See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994)
(“Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, are generally
upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate commerce, in part because ‘[t]he
existence of major in-state interests adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard
against legislative abuse.’”). Justice Ginsburg most recently articulated a political
process argument in a dissent in Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135
S. Ct. 1787, 1814-15 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting):
Residents, moreover, possess political means, not shared by
outsiders, to ensure that the power to tax their income is not
abused. “It is not,” this Court has observed, “a purpose of the
Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their own state
taxes.” The reason is evident. Residents are “insider[s] who
presumably [are] able to complain about and change the tax
through the [State's] political process.” Nonresidents, by contrast,
are not similarly positioned to “effec[t] legislative change.” As
Chief Justice Marshall, developer of the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, reasoned: “In imposing a tax the legislature acts
upon its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security against
erroneous and oppressive taxation.” The “people of a State” can
thus “res[t] confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the
influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard
them against . . . abuse” of the “right of taxing themselves and their
property.”
(internal citations omitted). See also Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 496.
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whether the tax unduly burdens interstate commerce.156 However, the
type of balancing that Pike demands—comparing the state’s interest in
acting with the burden placed on individuals—is unnecessary when the
tax is self-imposed; the taxpayer-voters have decided that the tax is
worth imposing, presumptively making the burdens imposed not
undue.
Of course, the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with undue
burdens on interstate commerce. This interstate commerce aspect
introduces the possibility that the political process may fail to
accurately balance the state’s interest and the burdens of the state tax;
the state tax may fall on an out-of-state taxpayer who is not involved
in the state’s political process and thus not be self-imposed.157
Alternatively, the interstate income of state residents might be subject
to higher tax rates than intrastate income.158 Interstate commerce may
become unduly burdened as a result of either.159 These scenarios are
not difficult to imagine; for example, Virginians might elect to impose
a one hundred percent tax rate on the income of Marylanders earned in
Virginia. Marylanders would presumably stop their Virginia activities
facing such a tax, and interstate commerce would have been
impermissibly chilled. Alternatively, Virginians might impose a
higher tax on income earned by Virginians in Maryland to encourage
Virginians to work solely in Virginia.
A threshold nexus requirement could address this problem, though
not in a completely satisfying manner. A nexus standard could protect
any interstate taxpayer from a state tax until the taxpayer’s connection
with the state is large enough that it would be allowed to vote or
otherwise participate in the political system.160 Once the interstate
taxpayer has a political voice in the taxing state, the political
protections against high tax rates could be relied on.

156

See supra note 151.
See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200 (“However, when a
nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax,
a State’s political processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse,
because one of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has
been mollified by the subsidy.”); see also Zelinsky, supra note 18, at 51 (observing
that “the temptation to tax nonvoters is politically irresistible”).
158
See generally Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787.
159
See id. at 1815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court has not shied away
from striking down or closely scrutinizing state efforts to tax residents at a higher
rate for out-of-state activities than for in-state activities (or to exempt from taxation
only in-state activities).”).
160
See Zelinsky, supra note 18, at 3 (“From [a political process] vantage, the
Commerce Clause concept of tax nexus is best understood as a rough, but
serviceable, proxy for the taxpayer’s standing in the political process.”).
157
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Difficulties of articulating such a standard comprehensibly
aside,161 a major problem for relying on the nexus requirement in this
way is that the interstate taxpayers’ political voice might not overcome
that of a majority of intrastate taxpayers, threatening to expose the
interstate commerce to higher tax rates.162 In the above example, native
Virginians might easily drown out the political influence of
Marylanders who have the ability to participate in Virginia’s political
process. Alternatively, Virginians working solely intrastate could elect
to tax other Virginians who work interstate at higher rates. Unless the
dormant Commerce Clause were to require states to afford out-ofstaters or those working out-of-state more political influence than pure
in-staters—an absurd proposition—a nexus standard based on political
voice would fail to effectively protect interstate commerce from too
high tax rates.
Therefore, to ensure that interstate commerce is appropriately
protected from unduly high tax rates, the in-state voters should be
relied on to reach the appropriate balance. This can be done by
prohibiting interstate commerce from being taxed more heavily than
intrastate commerce. Such a rule would allow in-state voters to be
relied on to prevent unduly burdensome tax rates from being imposed
on both intrastate and interstate commerce,163 regardless of the
connection the interstate commerce has with the state. Local
Virginians would be unable to subject Marylanders or interstate
Virginians to higher taxes than the local Virginians are willing to bear.
The Supreme Court has recognized the strength of such a nondiscrimination rule in this context and has not sought to impose limits
on the size of state tax rates on interstate commerce in the modern
jurisprudence.164 Instead, the third prong of the Complete Auto test has
been relied on to prevent states from specifically targeting interstate
commerce for higher tax burdens by forbidding states from treating
interstate commerce more harshly than intrastate commerce.165 Thus,
161

See id. at 55-59 (addressing the difficulties of a political voice standard for
substantial nexus).
162
See id. at 52-53 (discussing the “chief problem with this approach . . . that
interstate taxpayers’ political remedies do not always protect them from excessive
tax burdens.”).
163
See supra note 155.
164
In historical jurisprudence, all taxes on interstate commerce were forbidden
at various times. For descriptions of the evolution of the jurisprudence, see Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-84 (1995); Complete Auto
Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279-87 (1977); see also POMP, supra note 72, at
1-1 to 1-21.
165
E.g. Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794
(2015) (“Under our precedents, the dormant Commerce Clause precludes States from
‘discriminat[ing] between transactions on the basis of some interstate element.’ This
means, among other things, that a State ‘may not tax a transaction or incident more
heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
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a threshold nexus standard is not necessary or best suited to address
the potential undue burdens on interstate commerce of too high tax
rates.
2.

The Potential Undue Burdens of a Distorted Tax Base

Continuing to think of unduly burdensome taxes, one might next
suspect that a distorted tax base could create harmful results. Although
the in-state political process can be relied on to reach a constitutional
tax rate on interstate commerce, that political process may fail when
considering the construction of the tax base. The process can ensure
that the same bases are subject to tax regardless of whether the bases
are part of intrastate or interstate commerce, but the multijurisdictional
nature of interstate commerce introduces the complexity that the entire
tax base may not be connected with the taxing state.
A state tax might therefore burden interstate commerce by
attributing more of the interstate tax base commerce to its jurisdiction
than is appropriate, effectively engaging in the taxation of
extraterritorial activities.166 This sort of activity represents a potential
indirect means of taxing interstate commerce more heavily than
intrastate commerce and thus chilling the interstate commerce. For
instance, Arizona might impose an income tax which applies to all
income earned in the state. It is often difficult to source income to only
one place;167 for example, the income a data hosting service earns
performing services out of its California office for Arizona clients
arguably has both California and Arizona sources. If Arizona fully
included any income that has at least a partial Arizona source in the
See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 184-85 (“The difficult question in this case
is whether the tax is properly apportioned within the meaning of the second prong of
Complete Auto’s test, ‘the central purpose [of which] is to ensure that each State
taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.’ This principle of fair share is the
lineal descendant of Western Live Stock’s prohibition of multiple taxation, which is
threatened whenever one State’s act of overreaching combines with the possibility
that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed: the portion of value by
which one State exceeded its fair share would be taxed again by a State properly
laying claim to it.’”); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 170 (1983) (“[W]e will strike down the application of an apportionment formula
if the taxpayer can prove ‘by ‘clear and cogent evidence’ that the income attributed
to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted . .
. in that State,’ or has ‘led to a grossly distorted result.’”); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair,
437 U.S. 267, 276-81 (1978) (addressing concerns that Iowa attributed too much of
an interstate company’s income to the state through the use of a single sales factor
apportionment formula).
167
See, e.g., Catherine A. Battin, Maria P. Eberle, & Lindsay M. LaCava,
Demystifying the Sales Factor: Market-Based Sourcing, 72 ST. TAX NOTES 403, 403
(2014) (“The key problem faced by most service providers is determining where the
market for their services is located. Depending on the state, the market may be where
the benefit of the service is received by the customer, where the service is received,
where the customer is located, or where the service is delivered. Those varying
interpretations of the market may produce dramatically different results and create
complexities and uncertainties.”).
166
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state’s income tax base, that tax base would be overstated at the
expense of interstate commerce.
A threshold nexus requirement could be used to protect against this
type of potentially burdensome action but only in a highly ineffective
manner. The requirement could prevent a state from imposing tax on
interstate commerce until such time as the interstate taxpayer or
activity has such a large connection with the state that sourcing any
amount of the activity taxed to the state would not be unduly
burdensome. For instance, suppose that there is some tolerable margin
of error for states in determining their share of the tax base such that
one state might claim more of the base than it technically should—say
the claimed tax base must be within ten percentage points of the “true”
base.168 In such a case, the substantial nexus standard could protect
against the undue burden of overstated tax bases by preventing a state
from taxing interstate commerce until at least ninety percent of that
commerce occurred in the state (assuming the high end of the range of
acceptable tax bases is one hundred percent of the tax base).
This solution would be too restrictive on states by effectively
protecting most interstate commerce from state taxation, a situation the
Supreme Court has rejected.169 The potential tax base problems are
better solved through a system of apportionment—requiring the states
to divide up interstate tax bases—or a system of tax prioritization170—
ranking the authority of the states to impose tax on the interstate
commerce. Either system could ensure that no more than one hundred
percent of the interstate commerce is subject to tax; though an
apportionment system would be more respectful of each individual

168
See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 184 (observing a deviation of
“approximately 14%” would not violate the fair apportionment requirement whereas
a deviation of “more than 250%” would). Query how one would determine the
appropriate baseline against which to make such a comparison; the Court has not
provided clear guidance other than to say that using the accounting method of the
taxpayer will not suffice on its own. Id. at 182-84.
169
See, e.g., D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30-31 (1988)
(“Complete Auto abandoned the abstract notion that interstate commerce ‘itself’
cannot be taxed by the States. We recognized that, with certain restrictions, interstate
commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes.”); Colonial Pipeline
Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975) (“It is a truism that the mere act of carrying
on business in interstate commerce does not exempt a corporation from state
taxation. ‘It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in
interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases
the cost of doing the business.’”) (internal citations omitted); Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1959) (“[I]t is axiomatic
that the founders did not intend to immunize [interstate] commerce from carrying its
fair share of the costs of the state government in return for the benefits it derives
from within the State.”).
170
Justice Rutledge argued as early as 1944 that the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine should be setting such rules of tax priority among the states. See supra note
82.
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states’ tax power by not conditioning any one state’s authority on
another’s.
Indeed, to address these concerns, the Supreme Court has adopted
an apportionment system. The second prong of the Complete Auto test
requires that any state tax on interstate commerce be fairly apportioned
according to the amount of activity in the state.171 Therefore, in theory,
a state should be unable to tax one hundred percent of an activity that
takes place in more than one state; the state will only be allowed to
impose tax on that portion of the activity that takes place in the state.172
In this way, interstate commerce that has no connection with the taxing
state is protected from that state’s tax; the in-state tax base would be
nothing.173
A state tax might also burden interstate commerce by measuring
the tax base by something wholly unrelated to the activities in the
state,174 another potential indirect means of taxing interstate commerce
more heavily than intrastate commerce. For example, Colorado could
impose a “nature tax” on visitors to its state parks for the privilege of
visiting those parks but measure the tax by the income of the taxpayer,
which might create a tax inordinately large in relation to the taxpayer’s
activities in the state.
A threshold nexus requirement could protect against such harm by
again requiring that the interstate commerce have such a large
connection with the state that using any tax base would not be unduly
burdensome; though such a threshold would likely be too restrictive
on states.175 Instead, the political process protections discussed earlier
should prevent the use of this tactic to target out-of-state taxpayers,
171
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (“[W]e will
sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax . . . [2] is fairly
apportioned . . . .’”).
172
See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169 (“The first, and again obvious,
component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal
consistency—that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction,
it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed.”). In
practice, the constitutional apportionment standards leave a lot of room for state-bystate interpretation, which has created a web of overlapping and underlapping rules
that do not perfectly divide the tax base. See Cara Griffeth, The Complexities of
Apportionment and the Question of Uniformity, 56 ST. TAX NOTES 725 (2010);
Testimony of John A. Swain, Hearing on State Taxation: The Role of Congress in
Developing Apportionment Standards, (May 6, 2010), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2010/2010-10148-1.pdf.
173
The Due Process Clause also meaningfully restricts states’ ability to tax
things outside of their territories by demanding that there be some minimum
connection between the taxing state and the thing taxed. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 30608. In this way, the Due Process Clause addresses concerns about extraterritorial
state taxation. See Holderness, supra note 35, at 402-04 (discussing prohibitions on
extraterritorial state taxation).
174
See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1981).
175
See supra note 169.
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and the anti-discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test would
adequately protect interstate commerce.176
For its part, the state tax jurisprudence may have recognized the
ability of the political process to protect against these kinds of distorted
tax bases. Technically, the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test
prohibits tax bases that are unrelated to the activity in the state,
ensuring that the state tax is fairly related to whatever is occurring in
the state.177 However, the application of this prong is so forgiving to
states—almost any tax base will be found to be fairly related to
whatever is occurring in the state—that it effectively passes the
question to the political process.178
Thus, a threshold nexus standard is also ill-suited and unnecessary
to address the potential undue burdens on interstate commerce of
distorted tax bases.
3.

The Potential Undue Burdens of Tax Compliance Costs

Finally, one might suspect that a tax could become unduly
burdensome if the costs to comply with the tax were too large. Tax
compliance costs include things such as the labor required to ensure
that taxes are correctly paid, the capital investments in software and
computing capacity to run tax compliance systems, the ability to access
funds to pay the tax, and—importantly—the costs and risks associated
with handling audits by state revenue departments.179 Importantly,
176

See supra notes 155-165 and accompanying text.
See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981) (“[T]he fourth prong
of the Complete Auto Transit test imposes the additional limitation that the measure
of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of the contact, since it is the
activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State that may properly be made to bear
a ‘just share of state tax burden.’”).
178
See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995)
(“The fair relation prong of Complete Auto requires no detailed accounting of the
services provided to the taxpayer on account of the activity being taxed, nor, indeed,
is a State limited to offsetting the public costs created by the taxed activity. If the
event is taxable, the proceeds from the tax may ordinarily be used for purposes
unrelated to the taxable event.”); see also Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P.
Denning, Debate, The Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause: Abolishing the
Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 196, 206
(2007) (“Courts have heretofore been so reluctant to . . . apply the ‘fairly related’
prong of Complete Auto [that it] has become a dead letter.”) (comments of Brannon
P. Denning).
179
See GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters: Sales Taxes: States Could
Gain Revenue From Expanded Authority, but Businesses Are Likely to Experience
Compliance Costs, *15-27 (detailing compliance costs for sales and use tax
collection) (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter, GAO Report]; Holderness, supra note 18, at
331; Ralph B. Tower, Back to the Future? The Post-Wayfair Consumer Use Tax, 89
ST. TAX NOTES 879 (2018) (detailing the challenges of use tax compliance under
different regimes). The costs of addressing the risk of inadvertent non-compliance
and addressing potential non-compliance on audit tend to multiply the otherwise
relatively straightforward compliance costs. See GAO Report, supra, at *20-27;
177
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compliance costs tend to be relatively flat; they are roughly as
burdensome on the first bit of activity taxed as they are on the last.180
As an example of how these costs might unduly burden interstate
commerce, suppose it costs a New York vendor $475 for compliance
software that enables it to correctly collect and remit Massachusetts
sales tax. If the New York vendor makes only $50 per sale into
Massachusetts, it would presumably forgo making any sales into the
state until it makes at least ten and makes enough profit to cover its
compliance costs. The compliance costs would chill the taxpayer’s
interstate commerce until its activity in the state is profitable enough
to cover them. Here, a threshold nexus requirement shines and other
dormant Commerce Clause guardrails falter.
A threshold nexus requirement can protect against the potential
undue burden of tax compliance costs on interstate commerce by
ensuring that a state cannot impose tax (and the associated compliance
costs) until the commerce has enough of a connection with the state
such that the benefit of that connection to the taxpayer outweighs the
burden of the compliance costs. In short, a nexus with the taxing state
would not exist until the interstate taxpayer has made enough money
to cover the compliance costs of the state tax system. In the above
example, the nexus requirement could protect the New York vendor’s
first nine sales from Massachusetts sales tax. In this way, the nexus
requirement can ensure that interstate commerce is not exposed to
unduly burdensome tax compliance costs; costs that would chill the
interstate commerce.
Because of the flat nature of compliance costs,181 other dormant
Commerce Clause protections are ill-suited to address the burden of
Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 510 (“[C]ompensation for compliance costs
must include compensation for intangible costs such as executives’ time and the risk
of being subject to penalties for inadvertent noncompliance.”); Julia S. Bragg &
Robert J. Tuinstra, Jr., Managing State and Local Tax Risks, 57 ST. TAX NOTES 361
(2010) (detailing the various risks for taxpayers associated with state and local tax
compliance).
180
See Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, An Analysis of Internet Sales Taxation
and the Small Seller Exemption, at *35-36 (Small Business Administration, Nov.
2013) (surveying studies of compliance costs and observing that “These findings
indicate that there may be some economies of scale in terms of compliance costs,
echoing Bradford’s (2004) survey of the literature. As Bradford notes, however, the
apparent economies of scale may be based on the relatively fixed nature of
compliance costs”); see also Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 111 (“[A] firm’s costs
will likely be highest in its first year of operating in a state, but they should be
reduced thereafter. A firm utilizing software to manage many of these burdens might
find their costs to be more stable.”); Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 504-09
(analyzing hypothetical tax compliance costs based on reports of compliance costs
and observing that costs are “much higher as a percentage of sales for small vendors
than for large vendors,” demonstrating that such costs rise more slowly than the
benefits of sales activity); see also GAO Report, supra note 179, at *15-27.
181
See supra note 180.
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tax compliance costs because they focus on the structure and scope of
the tax itself. An apportionment system would technically assign a
small portion of interstate activity to a state if there is only a tiny
amount of the activity occurring in the state, which would require the
taxpayer to bear full compliance costs to pay a small amount of tax.
Those costs cannot be apportioned like the tax base; they must be
borne in full by someone. The anti-discrimination principle requires
only that the state not treat interstate commerce more harshly than
intrastate commerce. If a state chooses, though its political system, to
impose taxes with high compliance costs on intrastate commerce, then
the prong would not prevent the imposition of those same costs on
interstate commerce.182 Thus, a threshold nexus requirement is
uniquely situated to address the potential burden of tax compliance
costs on interstate commerce.
4.

The Compliance Burden Theory and Cumulative Tax
Burdens

The above analysis leads to the compliance burden theory of
dormant Commerce Clause nexus: the nexus requirement should exist
to prevent unduly burdensome tax compliance costs from being placed
on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has never explicitly
offered this justification for its articulated “substantial nexus”
requirement, but as discussed, its decisions addressing the personal
nexus requirement have threads of concerns about tax compliance
costs.183 For example, in Wayfair, the Court discussed how the
physical presence rule failed to protect small vendors from
burdensome “administrative costs of compliance.”184
Recognizing that the dormant Commerce Clause nexus
requirement is uniquely situated to protect against unduly burdensome
tax compliance costs raises an important question: should each state’s
tax compliance costs be considered in isolation, or should the nexus
requirement focus on the cumulative compliance costs borne by a
multistate taxpayer?185 Because the dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence exists to prevent individual states from acting to unduly
burden interstate commerce, it is not adequately equipped to address
182

The anti-discrimination prong does not work in reverse; it does not demand
that intrastate commerce be treated the same as interstate commerce. Intrastate
commerce is the sole domain of the taxing state, and federal law will not upset the
state’s rules for intrastate commerce in this context. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S.
252, 266 (1989) (“It is not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to protect state
residents from their own state taxes.”).
183
See supra Part I.A.1.
184
See supra note 121.
185
This question has long lingered in the substantial nexus area. For example, in
their pre-Wayfair analysis of the substantial nexus requirement, Gamage and
Heckman considered the burdens on interstate commerce created by aggregate tax
compliance costs from multiple jurisdictions See Gamage & Heckman, supra note
21, at 500-01.
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the cumulative effects of all states’ actions. Addressing those
cumulative effects instead demands political balancing and tradeoffs
that Congress has been tasked with under its Commerce Clause
authority.186 Simply put, in the absence of Congressional action,
individual states’ interests in exercising their tax powers over interstate
commerce are not dependent on what other states do. As such, the
compliance costs of each tax regime must be viewed in isolation.
The state taxation jurisprudence has implicitly recognized this
conclusion. The Supreme Court has been loath to invalidate one state’s
tax action under the dormant Commerce Clause when an interstate
taxpayer suffers from alleged undue burdens from the cumulation of
many states’ tax regimes; instead, the court has demanded clear proof
that the challenged tax regime, not the other states’, is the actual source
of the undue burdens, a nearly impossible task in practice.187
Additionally, the Quill Court failed to adopt Justice Rutledge’s
position that the dormant Commerce Clause should be setting rules of
tax priority between taxing states that have due process nexus with the
interstate commerce taxed, despite the fact that the Court adopted
Justice Rutledge’s suggested split of the Due Process Clause and
dormant Commerce Clause analyses of state tax actions. Setting rules
of tax priority would have accounted for cumulative tax burdens;
instead, the Quill Court left the issue in Congress’ hands.188 Until
Congress says otherwise, each individual state’s tax power is not
dependent on any other state’s actions.
It is true that Quill and Bellas Hess both expressed concern about
the potential of cumulative tax burdens on interstate taxpayers to
support the use of the physical presence rule for personal nexus.189
However, Wayfair should be read to dismiss those concerns in its focus
See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 760
(1967) (“The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national
economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution,
this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.”).
187
See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192-93
(1983) (“If California’s method of formula apportionment ‘inevitably’ led to double
taxation, that might be reason enough to render it suspect. But since it does not, it
would be perverse, simply for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to require
California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation
in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double
taxation.”); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 276-81 (1978) (refusing to
hold Iowa’s apportionment formula unconstitutional because it differed from other
states’ formulas and may have contributed to cumulative tax burdens on interstate
commerce).
188
Cf. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (“[The Commerce
Clause] aspect of our decision is made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is
not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that
Congress has the ultimate power to resolve. No matter how we evaluate the burdens
that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with
our conclusions.”).
189
See supra notes 58 and 64.
186
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on the taxpayer’s connection with the taxing jurisdiction alone. Indeed,
the Wayfair Court specifically addressed those concerns and claimed
that “[o]ther aspects of the Court’s doctrine can better and more
accurately address any potential [cumulative] burdens on interstate
commerce, whether or not Quill’s physical presence rule is
satisfied.”190
Although the Court did not expand on what those other aspects
might be, to the extent the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
does anything to address cumulative tax burdens on interstate
commerce, it does so mainly through the apportionment prong of the
Complete Auto test.191 In theory, apportionment ensures that no
cumulative tax burdens exist on interstate commerce by preventing
states from taxing any more than their fair share of the multistate tax
base.192 Therefore, the potential impact of cumulative tax burdens on
interstate commerce is properly addressed after dormant Commerce
Clause nexus exists—after the tax compliance costs imposed by the
taxing state are not unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.
In sum, the compliance burden theory holds that a threshold nexus
inquiry for state tax power is appropriate under the dormant Commerce
Clause because such an inquiry is uniquely capable of protecting
interstate commerce from the undue burdens of state tax compliance
costs. The theory focuses on individual state tax burdens; it is not
concerned with the cumulative tax compliance costs that a multistate
taxpayer might be subjected to. Relying on these conclusions, the next
section develops a theoretically-sound dormant Commerce Clause
nexus standard.
C. A Theoretically-Sound Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus
Standard
Understanding the compliance burden theory allows for the
development of a theoretically-sound dormant Commerce Clause
nexus standard. The nexus standard must take the costs associated with
tax compliance into account, as well as the benefits the taxpayer
receives from engaging in interstate commerce in the taxing state. This

190

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2093 (2018).
See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text..
192
See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (the
apportionment standard looks “to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that
portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State.
Here, the threat of real multiple taxation (though not by literally identical statutes)
may indicate a State’s impermissible overreaching.”) (internal citations omitted);
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169 (“The first, and again obvious, component of
fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal consistency—
that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result
in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed.”).
191
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standard taps into many of the concerns expressed by the Wayfair
Court and ensures that those concerns drive the nexus analysis.
1.

A Post-Wayfair Nexus Standard

The fundamental nature of the state tax power indicates that the
states should have a strong interest in efficient and effective tax
administration,193 which may demand that taxpayers bear many of the
costs of tax compliance. However, imposing those costs on interstate
commerce threatens to inappropriately chill that commerce.194
Therefore, the standard for dormant Commerce Clause nexus should
follow the greater dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and engage in
balancing similar to the Pike balancing test to determine when the
state’s interest in imposing tax compliance costs on interstate
commerce is unduly burdensome on that commerce.195 Traditional
Pike balancing may be difficult in the case of evaluating the state tax
burden itself,196 but the balancing becomes more straightforward when
examining the tax compliance costs.
The nexus standard that follows from the compliance burden
theory provides that dormant Commerce Clause nexus exists when the
benefits the taxpayer receives from conducting interstate commerce in
the state exceed the tax compliance costs imposed on the taxpayer.
Simply put, if the interstate commerce is profitable despite the tax
compliance costs,197 then the nexus standard should be satisfied. If not,
dormant Commerce Clause nexus should not be found. This standard
can be expressed formulaically as:
Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus ⇔ Benefit to Taxpayer of Activity
in State > Taxpayer Compliance Costs
This standard sends a clear message to states that compliance costs
are important. That said, the standard should not be terribly imposing
on states. Reasonable minds can disagree on how much the benefit to
the taxpayer should exceed the tax compliance costs, but at a minimum
that benefit should equal the costs to avoid the complete interruption
of interstate commerce. In any event, because tax compliance costs are
193

See supra note 152.
See supra Part II.A.3.
195
See supra note 147.
196
See supra note 153.
197
As Gamage and Heckman observed before the Wayfair case, “[b]eing exempt
from state sales and use taxes is sufficiently important to major e-commerce vendors
such as Amazon that these vendors can be expected to end most affiliations that
would deem them to have a physical presence within key customer states.” Gamage
& Heckman, supra note 21, at 485. This observation recognizes that remote vendors
were offered a significant competitive advantage over local vendors under the
physical presence rule regime. The proposal in this Article would only permit remote
vendors to avoid tax collection when the costs of doing so would be prohibitively
expensive for the taxpayer.
194
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relatively flat costs to the taxpayer, dormant Commerce Clause nexus
concerns should quickly fade away as the interstate taxpayer increases
its beneficial activities in the state.
The proposed nexus standard does not separate out personal nexus
and transactional nexus concerns, at least not directly. Instead, it
focuses on the compliance costs placed on the taxpayer as they relate
to the interstate activity in the taxing state. The reason for this approach
is that the two concerns become significantly intertwined under the
compliance burden theory. The burden of tax compliance costs must
fall to a taxpayer, so personal nexus may seem the more relevant
concern. If the taxpayer’s presence in the state is not beneficial enough
to justify taking on the burden of those costs, dormant Commerce
Clause nexus does not exist.
However, the relevant presence of the taxpayer is based on the
activities being conducted in and taxed by the state. Transactional
nexus turns out to be the most pertinent concern because the tax
compliance costs are specific to the activity taxed. If those compliance
costs would drive the taxpayer to stop that activity in the state, dormant
Commerce Clause nexus is not established. Because of the prominence
of the transactional nexus aspect under the compliance burden theory,
a coherent dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard can develop in
the jurisprudence even if the standard for personal nexus remains
vague or collapses into the due process personal jurisdiction
standard.198 All that is needed is the development of the transactional
nexus standard in line with the proposed standard.
In short, a theoretically-sound dormant Commerce Clause nexus
standard must consider the specific interstate activity taxed and how
tax compliance costs burden that activity. Personal nexus should exist
when transactional nexus exists, and even if other activities could
establish personal nexus,199 transactional nexus requires that each
Cf. Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 116 (“The Court’s best option in Wayfair
is to repeal the physical-presence rule and to not replace it.”). Many commentators
have argued that it would be appropriate for the personal nexus standard to collapse
into the due process nexus standard. See authorities cited supra note 44.
199
Certain case law indicates that the personal nexus and transactional nexus
inquiries may be totally separate from each other. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v.
California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 561 (1977) (“[T]he relevant
constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for requiring an out-of-state seller
to collect and pay the use tax is not whether the duty to collect the use tax relates to
the seller’s activities carried on within the State, but simply whether the facts
demonstrate “some definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State and]
the person . . . it seeks to tax.”). If personal nexus continues to evolve as a separate
line of doctrine from transactional nexus, then it would be possible for a taxpayer to
have nexus with the state but for the activity taxed not to have a connection with the
state. For example, an online bookseller could have its headquarters in Washington
State, establishing personal nexus, yet the transactional nexus doctrine would prevent
Washington State from taxing the bookseller’s sales made at its retail store in New
York.
198
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activity taxed be analyzed separately. The Court was correct to frame
the first prong of the Complete Auto test in terms of transactional
nexus,200 and the Quill Court’s focus on personal nexus was
unnecessary.201
2.

Assessing the Proposed Nexus Standard

In addition to fulfilling the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause
by protecting interstate commerce from unduly burdensome tax
compliance costs, the proposed nexus standard would prove beneficial
in a number of ways. First, by using a more focused dormant
Commerce Clause nexus standard, the analysis of state tax jurisdiction
can appropriately adapt to changing economies, business practices,
and tax systems. For example, if interstate services are more profitable
than interstate sales of consumer goods, then a smaller connection with
the services would be necessary to overcome the burden of tax
compliance costs. If businesses become more adept at complying with
complex tax systems, again a smaller connection with taxing states
would be necessary. As tax systems simplify, their compliance costs
fall, also requiring smaller connections.
Second, the proposed standard would allow states the flexibility to
expand their tax jurisdiction by absorbing the compliance costs of their
tax systems.202 The idea of states absorbing the compliance costs of
their tax systems may seem fanciful at first glance, but states already
do this to varying degrees. For example, many states provide “vendor
discounts” to vendors that collect sales and use taxes, whereby the
vendor is permitted to retain a percentage of the taxes collected in
order to offset the administrative burden of collecting and remitting.203
Additionally, member states of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement provide free compliance software to certain vendors.204

200

See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (laying out the
Complete Auto test as “we will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge
so long as the ‘tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’”) (emphasis
added).
201
Cf. Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA.
TAX REV. 157, 188-91 (2012) (discussing the “gratuitous elevation of the Commerce
Clause over the Due Process Clause”).
202
Pre-Wayfair, Gamage and Heckman proposed allowing states to move past
the physical presence rule if they fully absorbed the compliance costs of their tax
systems. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 503-12.
203
For a list of states providing vendor discounts, see Federation of Tax
Administrators, Sales Tax Rates and Vendor Discounts (Jan. 2019), available at
https://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Research/Rates/vendors.pdf.
204
See Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Governing Board, Certified Service
Providers
About,
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/certified-serviceproviders/certified-service-providers-about.
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Third, the proposed nexus standard would also bring the tax
jurisprudence more in line with other areas of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence,205 reducing variation between different areas of
law.206 Outside of the state tax arena, the Pike balancing test is used to
resolve conflicts between states and multijurisdictional people and
activities.207 Although the Pike balancing test is highly deferential in
practice to states,208 it seeks to balance the costs imposed by the state
on interstate commerce against the state’s interest in acting, 209 as
would the proposed dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard.210
This is not to claim that finding that balance will not present
challenges. If there was value to the physical presence rule, it was the
value that comes with generally applicable bright-line rules; they are
typically easier to apply that more fluid standards.211 A primary
criticism of the proposed nexus standard might be that it would require
intensive evidence gathering and complicated calculations to
determine when tax compliance costs become too burdensome.212
Indeed, some commentators argue that the application of a balancing
205

See Adam B. Thimmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 91
TEMPLE L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the state tax dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is well on its way to convening with the non-tax
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and that that coming together should be
formally completed).
206
See Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 116, 120-21; Hayes Holderness, The
Workability of Pike Balancing for State and Local Tax Collection Obligations, The
Surly Subgroup (Apr. 4, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/W752-J4AE; but see
Fatale, supra note 16, at 872 (claiming that “the Court has been retreating from Pike
for several decades, even in the regulatory context from which that standard
derives.”); Hellerstein & Appleby, supra note 16, at 292 (“[I]t has been argued that
the Court has implicitly repudiated a Pike balancing analysis in dormant commerce
clause cases . . . .”).
207
See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090-91 (2018).
208
See Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 108 (“The Court has not struck down a
state statute applying [Pike] balancing since the 1980s. The Roberts Court has
generally been unwilling to even engage in balancing.”); Hellerstein & Appleby,
supra note 16, at 292.
209
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 467 U.S.
573, 579 (1986) (observing that when a regulatory measure “has only indirect effects
on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly,” the Court applies a balancing
analysis, looking to “whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden
on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”) (citing Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
210
Thimmesch argues that the substantial nexus concept generally should be
understood to serve the same function as Pike balancing. See Thimmesch, supra note
21, at 106-08
211
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992) (“Like other
bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule appears artificial at its edges. . . . This
artificiality, however, is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule. Such a rule
firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to
collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.”).
212
See Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 109-12 (discussing the difficulties of a
balancing test as a substantial nexus standard); Fatale, supra note 16, at 873-74
(detailing the difficulty of applying the Pike balancing test to tax matters).
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test in this context is prohibitively difficult.213 However, these
arguments are based on the difficulty of sorting out the cumulative
burdens that tax compliance costs from multiple jurisdictions might
place on interstate commerce; admittedly, teasing out each
jurisdiction’s contribution to the cumulative burden would be a
prohibitively difficult task.214
As discussed though, the compliance burden theory instructs that
the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard must focus on the
compliance costs imposed by each taxing jurisdiction in isolation, not
in aggregate.215 This focus simplifies the balancing analysis:
compliance costs and taxpayer benefits are easier to calculate when
only considering one taxing jurisdiction at a time. Taxpayers should
be able to show fairly accurately their anticipated costs of compliance
with the individual state tax regime and the expected profitability of
their activities in the taxing state.
Even so, as a practical matter, the proposed standard would likely
lead to lawmakers and taxpayers resorting to proxies such as the
average profit margin of the particular activity taxed to simplify the
analysis, forsaking a truly pure application of the standard.216 Such
proxies would provide clarity and simplicity generally, and the
standard would serve as a safety valve for seriously aggrieved
taxpayers wishing to bring individual challenges to nexus
determinations.
Such challenges could be costly for states and taxpayers, but
should be rare. Given the low hurdle the proposed nexus standard
should present, taxpayers should only raise challenges when they have
213
See, e.g., Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 512-13. In Gamage and
Heckman’s view, the solution to the difficulty of balancing in this context is to only
find substantial nexus in those taxing jurisdictions that fully absorb the tax
compliance costs imposed on interstate commerce. Id. at 506-07, 513.
214
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
215
See supra Part II.B.4.
216
These sorts of administrative shortcuts are common in state and local tax
jurisprudence, as the cost of arriving at absolutely accurate measures is often
prohibitive. For example, the apportionment formulas states use to meet the fair
apportionment requirement of the Complete Auto test are recognized not to be
absolutely accurate; instead the formulas rely on measures like a taxpayer’s property,
payroll, and sales in the taxing state to reasonably approximate the taxpayer’s taxable
activity (i.e., income) in the state. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) (observing that the fair apportionment prong would
be violated only if “the income attributed to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate
proportions to the business transacted . . . in that State,’” before observing that the
three-factor property, payroll, and sales formula had “met our approval, [and had]
become . . . something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas
are judged.’”). The Container Corp. Court indicated that a deviation from the
absolutely accurate tax base of “approximately 14%” would not be “out of all
appropriate proportion” whereas a deviation of “more than 250%” would be. Id. at
184.
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clear and compelling evidence of their compliance costs and benefits,
and states could adopt conservative proxies to head off most
challenges. States could also avoid placing tax obligations on people
not directly connected to the activity taxed because such obligations
are more difficult to comply with that obligations placed on people
directly connected with the activity taxed.217 Finally, states that wish
to avoid dormant Commerce Clause nexus controversies could always
simplify their taxes and assume the compliance costs associated with
them.218 In other words, the states would control their dormant
Commerce Clause nexus destinies under the proposed standard.
Although the standard is proposed in a neutral effort to bring clarity
and reason to the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement, the
standard might be criticized as promoting a pro-state or anti-taxpayer
agenda. This criticism fails to consider whether the pre-Wayfair status
quo struck an appropriate balance between states and taxpayers. The
pre-Wayfair personal nexus rules were a thorn in most states’ sides, as
the multitude of efforts to undermine the rules demonstrate.219 The
traditional transactional nexus rules impose unnecessarily formalistic
restrictions on certain state tax actions.220 Loosening these rules in an
effort to more accurately track whether state tax systems place undue
burdens on interstate commerce is likely to broaden state tax
authority.221 But according to the compliance burden theory, that
authority should have been broader all along; prior doctrine was
inappropriately anti-state, and cleaning up the doctrine would place
taxpayers and states in a sounder balance.
In sum, the compliance burden theory underlying the dormant
Commerce Clause nexus requirement leads to fairly narrow
protections against undue burdens on interstate commerce.222 Properly
understood, the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement simply
carves out an amount of interstate activity that may cross a state’s line
and not be subject to the state’s taxing power: that amount of interstate
activity that would not continue if the taxpayer were made to bear the
costs of tax compliance. Adopting such a standard would bring clarity
to a murky area of law and allow for the appropriate amount of

217

See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 503-12 (discussing this option
and how states might implement it).
219
See Holderness, supra note 35, at 414-19 (surveying efforts to overturn the
physical presence rule).
220
See supra Part I.A.2.
221
See Thimmesch, supra note 21, at 117-19 (discussing the effects of loosening
the substantial nexus standards).
222
This standard achieves goals proposed by economists for appropriate nexus
standards. See Charles E. McLure Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes -- And
the Nuttiness of Responses Thereto, 2002 ST. TAX TODAY 179-2, *6 (Sep. 16, 2002)
(“Nexus (duty to collect tax) should depend on having either a substantial physical
presence or a non-de minimis amount of sales in a state . . . .”).
218
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flexibility needed for state taxes to adapt to changing tax and business
practices over time.
III.

BRINGING DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS DOCTRINE IN
LINE WITH THEORY

The crossroads created by the Wayfair decision offer the
opportunity to clarify and stabilize the protections of the dormant
Commerce Clause nexus requirement. Failing to do so, say by
allowing the nexus standard to completely collapse into the due
process personal jurisdiction standard, would open the door to
unprincipled expansions of state tax power and uncertain tax
obligations that may burden interstate commerce, particularly the
activities of small businesses and of entities that facilitate the
commerce of others, such as online marketplaces similar to Amazon
Marketplace, payment intermediaries like MasterCard, and common
carriers such as FedEx.
This Part details how the compliance burden theory and the
proposed nexus standard can be unambiguously incorporated into
existing substantial nexus doctrine by focusing on the resolution of
three post-Wayfair issues that may be soon litigated. Though the term
“substantial nexus” may be troublesome in its current state,223 it does
offer an expedient way to establish the protections of the proposed
standard in the case law. Courts and state tax lawyers have been using
the term for decades, and the Supreme Court seems unwilling to
completely abandon it, as Wayfair demonstrates. Rather than let it
fester in limbo, “substantial nexus” should be infused with meaning.
That said, the proposed standard need not find a home in the
“substantial nexus” term; if that term were abandoned, there would still
be a need to evaluate the burden tax compliance costs place on the
interstate taxpayer.
The three post-Wayfair issues considered below include the
constitutionality of imposing sales and use tax collection obligations
on someone other than the vendor or the customer, the vitality of the
formalism of the traditional transactional nexus doctrine, and whether
substantial nexus is needed at both the state and the local level when
local taxes are imposed. The key to appropriately developing the
substantial nexus doctrine through these issues is to recognize the
prominence of transactional nexus in the analysis and to adopt a
coherent transactional nexus standard, regardless of how Wayfair’s
“substantial privilege of carrying on business” personal nexus standard
is interpreted.

223

See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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A. Nexus between Taxpayer and Activity Taxed: The Case of
Marketplace Collection Obligations
South Dakota’s win in Wayfair has predictably been embraced by
the states, as demonstrated by a rush of legislative activity to bring
statutory personal nexus rules in line with the decision.224 Many states
(including South Dakota) are going further than the original South
Dakota model, which requires vendors who collected gross receipts of
more than $100,000 from sales to South Dakotans or who made more
than 200 individual sales to South Dakotans in the prior year to collect
the state’s sales tax.225 These states are extending tax collection
obligations to marketplaces, like Amazon Marketplace, eBay and Etsy,
that facilitate sales between vendors and customers.226 These laws
cover entities that allow third-party vendors to use their platform to
reach customers.
These marketplace collection laws often place a tax collection
obligation on the marketplace once sales made through its platform
pass the same thresholds that apply to the individual vendors.227 Such
an obligation can attach on a collective basis, so once enough sales are
made on the platform, regardless of who the vendor is, the marketplace
becomes responsible for tax collection. For example, South Dakota’s
marketplace collection law requires the marketplace to collect the
state’s sales tax if the marketplace “[f]acilitates the sales of two or
more marketplace sellers that, when the sales are combined, are subject
to [the South Dakota law at issue in Wayfair], even if the marketplace
sellers are not separately or individually subject to [that law].”228
A clear policy behind these marketplace collection laws is to push
tax collection obligations to the most consolidated levels possible, on
the belief that economies of scale at such levels will smooth the
224

See Roxanne Bland, South Dakota v. Wayfair: The Fallout, 90 ST. TAX
NOTES 621, 621 (2018) (“After the U.S. Supreme Court’s June ruling in South
Dakota v. Wayfair jettisoned the rule equating physical presence with substantial
nexus for purposes of requiring remote vendors selling into a state to collect that
state’s sales tax, many sales tax states rushed to draft new economic nexus standards
to drop into their tax codes.”); Pomp, supra note 125 (detailing states’ post-Wayfair
legislative efforts).
225
S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2.
226
See Ala. H.B. 470 (2018); Conn. S.B. 417 (2018); Iowa S.B. 2417 (2018);
Ky. H.B. 366 (2018); Minn. H.F. 1 (2018); Okla. H.B. 1019 (2018); Pa. H.B. 542
(2017); R.I. H.B. 5175 (2017); South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018); Wash.
H.B. 2163 (2018); see also Multistate Tax Comm’n, White Paper regarding Issues
in the Implementation of the Wayfair Decision, *4 (Nov. 7, 2018), available at
https://perma.cc/UHQ4-TXK7 [hereinafter, MTC, White Paper]; Jad Chamseddine,
2019: The Year of Marketplace Legislation, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 1096, 1096 (2018);
Lauren Loricchio, States Want Marketplace Facilitators to Collect Tax for Small
Sellers, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 749, 749 (2018); Shanske, Gamage, & Thimmesch,
Marketplaces, supra note 16, at 112.
227
E.g. South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018) (enrolled Sept. 12, 2018).
228
South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018) (enrolled Sept. 12, 2018).

48

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314272

collection of taxes.229 One marketplace could collect and remit taxes
instead of thousands of individual vendors. In theory, this state of
affairs could ease the administrative burden on a state to receive taxes
collected and to audit tax collectors.230 In addition, the laws will
predictably expand the number of sales on which tax is collected
because the marketplaces will be collecting tax on sales made by
vendors who are individually not subject to collection obligations.231
As others note, this expansion increases fairness of treatment between
vendors;232 the states also figure to collect more taxes through these
laws.233 It is not difficult to imagine states playing with the idea of
extending these types of laws to cover additional entities that facilitate
the commerce of others, such as payment intermediaries and common
carriers.234
Given the loosening of the personal nexus standard in Wayfair,
these marketplace collection laws may pass constitutional muster,235
but they should not be guaranteed success given the compliance costs
they will place on the marketplaces and the indirect benefits the
marketplaces may receive from the taxing states. Take the example of
Etsy, which vendors located around the country use to connect with
customers. Assume there are one hundred vendors using Etsy that sell
into South Dakota and that their sales collectively satisfy the state’s
statutory personal nexus rule. South Dakota’s law would require Etsy
to collect the sales taxes imposed on the transactions that occur on its
platform as long as the constitutional substantial nexus standard is met.
Current personal nexus doctrine appears not to obstruct South
Dakota’s efforts significantly. If Etsy is purposefully exploiting the
229
See Chamseddine, supra note 226, at 1096 (“The trend is happening mainly
because it is more fruitful for states to require collection by marketplace providers.
‘It makes a lot more sense for states to have marketplace platforms or facilitators
registered and collecting rather than having to deal with hundreds or thousands of
marketplace sellers individually,’ said Marshall Stranburg, deputy executive director
of the Multistate Tax Commission.”); MTC, White Paper, supra note 226, at *3 (“In
order to increase sales/use tax collection compliance levels, several states are
imposing requirements on marketplace facilitators to collect and remit the sales/use
tax on their marketplace sales.”).
230
See Chamseddine, supra note 226, at 1096; MTC, White Paper, supra note
226, at *3.
231
See Loricchio, supra note 226, at 749.
232
Shanske, Gamage, & Thimmesch, Marketplaces, supra note 16, at 112.
233
Chamseddine, supra note 226, at 1096 (“States that don’t expand their remote
sales tax collection requirements to marketplaces could ‘miss out on a huge chunk’
of revenue, according to Richard Cram, also of the MTC.”).
234
See Rifat Azam & Orly Mazur, Cloudy with a Chance of Taxation, 21 FLA.
TAX REV. ___ (forthcoming) (arguing for requiring payment intermediaries to collect
excise taxes on cloud computing transactions that they facilitate).
235
See Shanske, Gamage, & Thimmesch, Marketplaces, supra note 16, at 112;
but see Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 16, at 134 (“Nor is it clear whether a state
may compel the marketplace facilitator to collect and remit use tax for its client, the
remote seller.”).
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state’s marketplace, say by supporting vendors in the state or selling
into the state and deriving income therefrom, then it will have exposed
itself to personal nexus with the state.236 A court might follow
Wayfair’s lead and declare personal nexus to exist because it thinks
Etsy has “purposefully availed itself of the substantial privilege of
carrying on business” in the state.237 However, this analysis should
give states and Etsy pause; personal nexus might not exist if the
substantial nexus standard is allowed to advance past Wayfair’s vague
expression.238
Under the proposed substantial nexus standard, if the compliance
costs of collecting the sales tax imposed on the marketplace rendered
the marketplace’s activities in the state unprofitable, personal nexus
would not exist (i.e. Etsy would not have availed itself of the
substantial privilege of carrying on business in the state). One
challenge under the proposed standard would lie in determining the
profitability of the marketplace’s facilitation of sales in the state. The
other challenge would be determining the compliance costs imposed
on the marketplace by the taxing state.
At first glance, it is not clear that any given marketplace would be
benefiting from the taxing state simply by helping unrelated vendors
benefit from the state by facilitating those vendors’ sales into the state.
The analysis would first need to determine if the marketplace’s
activities outside of the taxing state could be attributed to the state.
This analysis would likely depend on the arrangement between the
marketplace and its vendors: what does the marketplace do for its
vendors and what does it earn from each vendor for those services,
particularly with respect to the taxing state? If the marketplace actively
promotes its platform in the state and collects fees based on a pertransaction basis, this task may be relatively straight-forward; if the
marketplace is more passive or general fees are collected, then the task
may become harder. This analysis should be expected to separate
active marketplaces like Etsy from more passive ones like Craigslist.
Issues exist on the compliance costs side of the analysis as well.
There is an important difference between the vendor who is asked to
collect taxes on her own sales and the marketplace that is asked to
collect taxes on someone else’s sales. The vendor has direct knowledge
236

See supra Part I.A.1.
See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
238
Wayfair may have cut off the path to such advancement of the personal nexus
standard when it indicated that some other aspect of the dormant Commerce Clause
should address tax compliance costs. See id. (“The question remains whether some
other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act.”).
Even if the path to advancing the personal nexus standard is cut off, substantial nexus
doctrine can still align with theory through the development of the transactional
nexus standard, which is the more important of the two aspects of the substantial
nexus requirement. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
237
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of the transaction, direct access to the information required to
accurately collect taxes, and direct access to the funds needed to pay
the tax; the marketplace does not.239 The marketplace would have to
retrieve that information from the individual vendors and may have to
pay the taxes out-of-pocket and seek redress through costly measures
such as legal suits against vendors or customers.240
The marketplace’s indirect connection to the transactions at issue
is most concerning for the increased costs of addressing audit risks; the
marketplace may need to rely on vendors for information necessary to
comply with the state tax law, and vendor errors could increase the
marketplace’s costs of interacting with a state taxing authority.241 By
taking these costs into account, the personal nexus standard would
reflect an understanding that the taxpayer’s connection to the activity
taxed matters.242 In the case of the marketplace collection laws,
collecting tax on other people’s sales may burden a marketplace too
much, such that it forbids vendors to make sales into the taxing state
239

This is not to say that the marketplace could not easily acquire such
information from the vendors, but in the first instance, the marketplace does not have
that information and must incur some cost to retrieve it. See infra notes 243-245 and
accompanying text.
240
For example, the South Dakota marketplace collection law treats the sales
from the vendor as sales for resale, placing the burden on the marketplace to collect
from the ultimate consumer. South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018) (enrolled
Sept. 12, 2018). A major source of compliance costs in the sales and use tax area is
determining which sales are exempt from tax, which includes the collection and
verification of exemption certificates from tax-exempt purchasers such as business
who are not purchasing the goods at retail. See, e.g., Cara Griffeth, Streamlining
Versus “Amazon” Laws: The Remote Seller Dilemma, 55 ST. TAX NOTES 351, 354
(2010) (“Determining how to handle tax-exempt sales, sales tax holidays, and
product taxability coding can be a daunting task, particularly for small and midsize
businesses. It has been estimated that sales tax exemptions account for 60 percent of
the cost of compliance for small businesses.”); Dick Eppleman, Tax Practitioners
and State Auditors Focus on Managing Sales Tax Exemption Certificate, 16-FEB J.
MULTISTATE TAXATION 26 (2007) (detailing compliance burdens associated with
exemption certificates); Britt C. Dobbins & Wendy M. Leonard, Compliance
Strategies Regarding Resale and Other Sales Tax Exemption Certificates, 16-FEB J.
MULTISTATE TAXATION 14 (2003) (discussing common issues associated with
exemption certificates). As the tax collector becomes further removed from the
purchaser, it may be more and more costly to obtain and verify those certificates.
241
See Holderness, supra note 18, at 334-39 (detailing the impact that the
relationship between the taxpayer and the activity taxed can have on the burden
placed on the taxpayer to collect taxes); see also Paul Jones, Etsy Releases List of
States Where It Collects Sales Taxes, 2019 ST. TAX TODAY 15-6 (Jan. 23, 2019)
(“[Etsy] said collecting sales and use tax for multiple taxing jurisdictions using
different rules is complicated and difficult, and urged sellers to support its effort to
lobby lawmakers to back federal legislation that would standardize rules. ‘Our
experience in [in Washington and Pennsylvania] . . . has shown us how hard it is to
properly classify the 50 million handmade, craft, and vintage goods . . . into taxable
item categories,’ Etsy said.”).
242
See id. (arguing that even under the physical presence regime, the dormant
Commerce Clause demanded some connection between the taxpayer and the activity
taxed).
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using its platform. However, where the state’s market is important
enough to the marketplace, the compliance costs should not present a
significant hurdle to South Dakota’s efforts.
This observation highlights that the personal nexus inquiry need
not impose a high burden on states.243 Etsy could demand that its
vendors transmit transaction information to it in a reasonable
manner.244 If all marketplaces did this, Etsy would not suffer market
share because of the action and much of the harm might dissipate.
Sifting through many different vendors’ transactions may be costlier
than only dealing with one’s own sales, but the statutory thresholds
could be adjusted to account for this discrepancy.
The important point is that personal nexus standard should take
into account how the state tax system affects different taxpayers,
bringing the standard closer in line with the traditional Pike balancing
test and better fulfilling the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. The taxpayer’s connection with the activity taxed is an
important indicator of the burden of compliance costs, and as that
connection becomes weaker and less direct, the demands of personal
nexus should be expected to increase.245 The personal nexus of entities
that facilitate the commerce of others, like marketplaces, payment
intermediaries, and common carriers, necessitate a close look under
the proposed standard.
The above analysis highlights a second point about the proposed
substantial nexus standard: transactional nexus is the prominent
concern, not personal nexus. In the above example, though the analysis
is framed as developing the personal nexus standard, recognizing the
importance of the relationship between the taxpayer and the activity
taxed would wed the personal nexus standard to the transactional
nexus standard. When the compliance costs imposed by the sales tax
would cause the interstate sales activity to cease, transactional nexus
with the taxing state should not exist. And Etsy, as the taxpayer, should
also lack personal nexus with the taxing state when those interstate
sales would cease. To be clear, Etsy would not have to stop interacting
with the taxing state, it would just be protected from tax obligations
until its activities were profitable enough to cover the tax compliance
costs.
Thus, a theoretically-sound substantial nexus standard could do
away with the personal nexus inquiry,246 but given the prominence of
the inquiry in the Wayfair case, courts are not primed to abandon the
personal nexus aspect of the substantial nexus doctrine. The above
243

See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 241 (detailing Etsy’s sales tax collection efforts).
245
Cf. Holderness, supra note 18, at 334-39.
246
See supra note 198.
244
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approach to personal nexus would at least bring the doctrine closer in
line with theory but has the potential to fail to prevent undue burdens
on interstate commerce when the taxpayer has a large presence in the
state unrelated to the activity taxed.247 For example, Washington State
would likely find personal nexus with Seattle-based Amazon.com for
almost any kind of tax, regardless of the specific compliance costs
associated with the tax. Some case law even indicates that a taxpayer’s
nexus with a state need not be related to the transaction taxed by the
state, though this case law appears to be grounded in the Due Process
Clause rather than the dormant Commerce Clause.248 Thus, the above
approach to personal nexus might not provide the appropriate
protections against undue burdens on interstate commerce,249 but
developing the transactional nexus standard as described in the next
section can ensure that those protections exist.
B. Ghosts of Transactional Nexus: The Ongoing Vitality of Sales
and Use Tax Formalism
As noted, the issue in Wayfair was personal nexus, but the South
Dakota statute had a lurking transactional nexus issue.250 That issue
resulted from the fact that the South Dakota statute only requires
remote vendors to collect sales taxes; there is no obligation to collect
use taxes.251 In fact, South Dakota doubled down on its disregard for
this issue by passing a marketplace collection bill that also only applies
to the collection of sales taxes.252 If South Dakota lacks transactional
nexus with out-of-state sales—as the pre-Wayfair jurisprudence
247

Given historical practice and the lack of clear guidance from the Wayfair
Court, courts should be expected to find personal nexus where the taxpayer has a
high amount of activity in the taxing state, particularly where the taxpayer has a
physical presence in the state. Even the Wayfair Court was taken in by the amount
of activity in the state, simply stating that such amount of activity met the substantial
nexus standard without deeper explanation. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138
S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). However, a prominent practitioner has suggested that a
taxpayer could challenge a finding of substantial nexus based on its physical
presence in the taxing state, arguing that after Wayfair, physical presence alone is
not enough to establish personal nexus. See Amy Hamilton, What Will the First PostWayfair Litigation Look Like?, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 609, 609-08 (2018) (discussing
comments of Leah Robinson).
248
See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551,
561 (1977). In determining that the taxpayer’s nexus did not depend on the activity
taxed by the state, the Nat’l Geographic Soc’y Court claimed that the test was
“simply whether the facts demonstrate ‘some definite link, some minimum
connection, between [the State and] the person . . . it seeks to tax’” and cited to the
Miller Brothers case for support. This language used by the Court parallels due
process standards for nexus, not those of the dormant Commerce Clause, and Miller
Brothers is best viewed as a due process case, as argued earlier. See supra note 57;
see also Holderness, supra note 18, at 334-38 (arguing that Nat’l Geographic Soc’y
is not controlling for dormant Commerce Clause purposes).
249
See Hellerstein & Appleby, supra note 16, at 291-92.
250
See supra note 127.
251
See S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2.
252
See South Dakota S.B. 2 (1st Special Sess., 2018) (enrolled Sept. 12, 2018).
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suggests that it does253—then any attempt to require vendors to collect
those sales taxes should fail. In contrast, it is clear under the
jurisprudence that South Dakota could require vendors to collect use
taxes on the products that they sell into the state for use there, making
the limited scope of the South Dakota statutes a seemingly incredible
foot-fault for the state.254 States like South Dakota who impose only
sales tax collection obligations on remote sellers have left themselves
vulnerable to legal challenge.255
If Wayfair is read to reject this transactional nexus formalism, then
a challenge to a law like South Dakota’s would fail. However, the
Wayfair Court’s cavalier approach to the transactional nexus issue
makes reliance on such a reading risky. Even so, accepting that
Wayfair did not directly dismantle the historical formalism created by
transactional nexus doctrine does not require accepting that the
decision did not provide the tools for dismantling that formalism in
future. Should a remote vendor challenge a sales-tax-only collection
regime, the courts would have to confront the transactional nexus issue
head on.
Under current doctrine, the states would likely lose in such a
challenge against their efforts to tax out-of-state sales.256 However,
Wayfair provides courts with the basis to explicitly abandon the
formalistic distinction between sales taxes and use taxes by bringing
the transactional nexus standard in line with the compliance burden
theory. Wayfair began this task in the personal nexus context, and that
alignment should be continued in the transactional nexus context.
A court approaching the transactional nexus issue should recognize
Wayfair’s concern with compliance costs and establish that those costs
associated with the particular activity taxed cannot be allowed to cause
the activity to cease in the state. There is no place in this analysis for
categorical declarations that transactional nexus does or does not exist
with respect to a particular form of taxation.257 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has demanded that the substance rather than the form of a tax
control its constitutionality; to determine the substance of a tax, the
Court asks who or what the tax is economically imposed on.258
253

See supra Part I.A.2.
See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125. Although there is an easy legislative
fix to this problem—expanding the statutes to cover the collection of use taxes, the
experience in South Dakota has shown that some states may be unaware of the
gravity of the issue or unwilling to address it. See Pomp, supra note 125.
255
See Holderness & Boch, supra note 125.
256
See supra Part I.A.2. Dilworth prohibits a state from imposing a sales tax on
sales consummated outside of the state.
257
See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
258
See generally Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)
(rejecting formalistic labels as controlling the constitutionality of a state tax and
instead looking to economic realities of the tax); see also Comptroller of Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015) (“We see no reason why the
254
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Although sales taxes and use taxes are formally imposed on separate
transactions, they have largely been thought of as economically
equivalent taxes on consumption.259
Therefore, the only proper room for difference in the jurisdictional
reach of sales taxes and use taxes (or any taxes) under the dormant
Commerce Clause should result from differences in their compliance
costs, as the proposed standard recognizes. Any concerns that
loosening the transactional nexus standard would allow states to tax
transactions beyond their borders are more appropriately addressed by
due process protections against extraterritoriality and the requirements
of the apportionment prong of the Complete Auto test rather than by
the substantial nexus prong.260
Breathing life into the transactional nexus standard as proposed
would result in a theoretically-sound substantial nexus standard
regardless of what the courts do with the personal nexus doctrine. The
proposed standard would ensure that the compliance costs associated
with each tax are considered and would protect taxpayers from undue
costs related to small amounts of interstate activity in a state.
C. Over 10,000 Taxing Jurisdictions: Substantial Local Nexus
A final post-Wayfair issue to consider is whether substantial nexus
will be required at the local level as well as the state level. 261 Many

distinction between gross receipts and net income should matter, particularly in light
of the admonition that we must consider ‘not the formal language of the tax statute
but rather its practical effect.’”) (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279); Walter
Hellerstein, Michael J. McIntyre, & Richard D. Pomp, Commerce Clause Restraints
on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REV. 47, 49 (1995). As Gamage
and Heckman note, “[w]ho bears a tax or subsidy is a function of the relative price
elasticities of supply and demand and is not fixed by who has a legal obligation to
pay the tax.” Gamage & Heckman, supra note 21, at 486 n. 18; see also Hellerstein,
McIntyre, & Pomp, supra, at 54 n. 42.
259
See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 18, at 347 (2018); McLure, supra note 72,
at ¶¶ 9-16. Because the use tax is often framed as merely a backstop to the sales tax,
see POMP, supra note 72, at 6-39 to 6-43, the substantial nexus jurisprudence up to
Wayfair had pushed use taxes into the shadow of sales taxes, and the transactional
nexus standard for use taxes was not extended to sales taxes, which would have
alleviated many of the formalism concerns in this area. See Holderness, supra note
18, at 345-55 (tracing how use taxes were unnecessarily pushed into the shadow of
sales taxes for nexus purposes).
260
See supra notes 166-173 and accompanying text.
261
See Joe Crosby, Kendall L. Houghton, Stephen P. Kranz, Diann L. Smith, &
Doug Sheppard, Wayfair: The Present and Future of State Taxes, 90 ST. TAX NOTES
1073, 1076-77 (2018) (“[O]ne other question that follows on Wayfair is whether we
will see localities attempting to use Wayfair-like authority to reach outside their
borders, even outside the state they’re in, and impose local business licensing or other
types of imposition on companies that are making sales into the locality.”); Sarah
Horn, Jill McNally, & Rebecca Newton-Clarke, One by One, Most States Responded
to South Dakota v. Wayfair in 2018, RIA STATE & LOCAL TAX UPDATE (Dec. 12,
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localities impose their own taxes—Chief Justice Roberts noted in his
Wayfair dissent that there are “over 10,000 jurisdictions [that] levy
sales taxes”262—and these local taxes conform to state-level taxes in
varying degrees.263 Additionally, some localities administer their own
taxes, whereas others rely on the state to administer their taxes.264
Thus, a real possibility exists that a local-level tax could impose
significant additional compliance costs on an interstate taxpayer or
activity, such that the taxpayer might avoid conducting activities in
that locality.265 This result would seem to violate the demands of the
compliance burden theory.
However, localities come into existence differently than states. The
states are creations of the people and have divested some of their
powers to the federal government, as relevant here, the power to
regulate interstate commerce.266 Localities are creations of the states
and often are viewed as mere extensions of the state.267 In other words,
by creating a locality, the state merely decentralizes some of its
operations in favor of various goals.268 With the source of local power
in mind, it becomes unclear whether local-level substantial nexus is
needed once state-level substantial nexus exists.
Although current substantial nexus doctrine does not provide a
clear answer to the issue, the problem is not as troubling as it might
appear. As a practical matter, the local-level substantial nexus question
is currently trivial. The South Dakota model for statutory substantial
nexus provisions—which most states have followed269—imposes
thresholds designed to protect small vendors from being subject to the
state’s tax obligations.270 As such, these thresholds likely do not come
2018) (discussing the confusion brought about as a result of the Wayfair decision,
including when a business must collect local taxes).
262
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2103 (2018) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
263
See POMP, supra note 72, at 6-44 to 6-46.
264
See id.
265
See Roxanne Bland, supra note 224, at 623-24 (discussing concerns about
the impact of a complex web of local taxes on Colorado’s efforts to implement a
South Dakota-style nexus statute).
266
See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, at 7-8 (8th ed. 2016).
267
Id. at 8-9; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—the Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1990) (discussing the role of the local
government in relation to the state).
268
BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 266, at 9-16; see also Yishai Blank,
Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263, 270-77 (2006)
(discussing various goals localities are argued to achieve).
269
See supra note 224.
270
S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2 (imposing thresholds of $100,000 of gross
revenue from sales into the state or 200 separate sales into the state before statutory
personal nexus exists); see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099
(2018) (“[T]he Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited business
in South Dakota.”).
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close to the constitutional line for substantial nexus; any person or
activity exceeding the thresholds likely established constitutional
substantial nexus long before the thresholds were met. This statement
may not be true in all instances, but on the assumption that the states
will continue with the South Dakota model and not draw close to the
constitutional line for substantial nexus, it seems unlikely that the
added compliance burdens of local taxes would trigger constitutional
concerns; the statutes will protect interstate commerce more than the
dormant Commerce Clause.
If the proposed substantial nexus standard is implemented, then the
issue of local-level substantial nexus becomes a non-issue. The
substantial nexus standard would permit those tax obligations that do
not overwhelm the interstate commerce with compliance costs, such
that the taxpayer would cease the activity in the taxing jurisdiction.
This standard necessitates a tax-by-tax examination in order to
determine whether the appropriate substantial nexus exists in each
case.
Therefore, a vendor asked to collect a local tax would have grounds
to challenge that specific locality’s action if the tax’s compliance
burden was too high. Alternatively, and to the same practical effect, if
one views the locality simply as an extension of the state, then the state
would lack substantial nexus with the taxpayer or activity when the
local taxes increased the compliance burdens above the constitutional
line. Substantial nexus at the state level could be restored by
eliminating the local tax in that instance or by reducing the differences
between the state- and local-level taxes and the complexities those
differences create. In other words, if a state feels that its ability to
impose taxes is impaired on substantial nexus grounds because of the
complexity of local taxes, the state can reign those local taxes in.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Wayfair decision brought the dormant Commerce Clause
nexus doctrine into the twenty-first century and thus was one of the
most impactful in the field of state and local taxation since the Quill
case it partially overturned. As a result of its abandonment of the
historical physical presence rule for personal nexus, Wayfair might be
read to have pushed the dormant Commerce Clause’s nexus
requirement towards the Due Process Clause’s personal jurisdiction
requirement. Alternatively, the case could be read to have begun the
work of establishing a nexus doctrine that more coherently addresses
the concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause.
This Article has argued for the latter reading and continues the
work of Wayfair by fully developing the compliance burden theory of
dormant Commerce Clause nexus and the standard that follows from
that theory. The Article also mapped out the path for incorporating this
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theoretically-sound nexus standard into the jurisprudence through
future litigation that unanswered questions from Wayfair should spur.
Ensuring that the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine continues
to come into alignment with theory will prevent the protections of the
doctrine from withering away and will ensure that interstate
commerce—particularly that conducted by small businesses and
online marketplaces—is not subjected to undue burdens from state tax
compliance costs. With a little help, Wayfair can be the beginning of
the way forward for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine,
not the end.
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